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Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet
Jane C. Ginsburg*
1998 ended with voluminous copyright legislation, pompously titled the “Digital
Millennium Copyright Act” [hereafter “DMCA”], and intended to equip the
copyright law to meet the challenges of online digital exploitation of works of
authorship.  1999 and 2000 have brought some of the ensuing confrontations
between copyright owners and Internet entrepreneurs to the courts.  The evolving
caselaw affords an initial opportunity to assess whether the copyright law as
abundantly amended can indeed respond to digital networks, or whether the rapid
development of the Internet inevitably outstrips Congress’ and the courts’ attempts
to keep pace.
In titling this Article “Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet,” I am inquiring
into the evolving allocation of power between copyright owners and copyright-
using Internet entrepreneurs.  While the DMCA may have appeared to weight the
balance toward copyright owners,1 many of the current challenges do not directly
implicate the DMCA.  Moreover, to the extent that the cases call for interpretation
of the DMCA, the results so far have been mixed, albeit at last count somewhat
more favorable to copyright owners.  Finally, whatever the results in a given case,
significant questions remain about the practical enforceability of the DMCA’s
provisions regarding circumvention of technological protections, and removal or
alteration of copyright management information.
I will address recent Internet-related controversies concerning the following
topics: technological protection measures and copyright management information;2
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of
Law.  Thanks to Bill Way, Esq. and Joleen Winther, Esq., to Professor Jessica Litman, Professor Eben
Moglen, and to Deborah Fine, and Allison Engel, both Columbia Law School class of 2000, for research
assistance.  Thanks also to Tucker McCrady and Brian Verminsky, both Columbia Law School class of
2001, for additional research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519 (1999); Jonathan Band &
Taro Issihiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provisions in the Copyright Act: A Flawed First Step, 3
CYBER. LAW. 2 (1999).
2. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp.2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (preliminary
injunction ordered January 20, 2000 against websites posting “De-CSS” software to neutralize DVD
access-controls), 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (permanent injunction awarded); RealNetworks,
Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000)
(preliminary injunction entered against device converting streamed audio signal from an uncopiable
format into a signal that may be copied). Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (no violations of copyright management information).
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fair use and linking3; “private” copying online services4; and choice of law issues
posed by foreign websites accessible in the U.S.5
II. DMCA ISSUES: CIRCUMVENTION OF ACCESS CONTROLS
Two courts so far have construed the §12016 provisions prohibiting the
distribution of devices primarily designed to circumvent access controls.  One
controversy, RealNetworks v. Streambox, concerned the commercial distribution of
a product designed to convert streaming-only RealAudio music files into files that
defendant’s customers could download and retain.  The other case, Universal City
Studios v. Reimerdes, was initiated by members of the Motion Picture Association
of America against the operators of websites that had posted the “hack” to defeat
the encryption on DVDs.
In RealNetworks v. Streambox, the Western District of Washington preliminarily
enjoined distribution of “Streambox VCR” on the ground that the device violated
both §1201(a)’s prohibition on the circumvention of access controls, and
§1201(b)’s prohibition on circumvention of copy controls implemented by the
RealAudio server.  RealNetworks employed an authorization mechanism through
which a RealAudio server recognizes a RealPlayer, and having recognized it, sends
the Player the requested work in streaming format.  The court called this
authentication measure the “secret handshake.”  The “secret handshake” is an
access control measure within the definition of §1201(a)(3)(B) because it “requires
the application of information, or a process or treatment, with the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work,” here, to tell the Real server to
communicate the work to the RealPlayer so that users may listen to the music.
Copyright owners who make their works available through RealNetworks designate
whether they wish the works to be delivered as streaming only, so that recipients
cannot copy the work, or as a downloadable stream.  The “Copy Switch” on the
Real server indicates whether the work may or may not be copied.  Most copyright
owners choose not to permit copying.  The RealPlayer reads the information on the
server; if the Copy Switch is turned off, the RealPlayer will deliver the work in
streaming only format.
Streambox reverse engineered the RealPlayer software to ascertain the code that
produces the “secret handshake,” and then incorporated the code into its “VCR”
3. See Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (C.D. Cal.  2000); Intellectual
Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999); Universal City
Studios, 82 F. Supp.2d 211 (amending complaint to include claims against websites for linking to sites
containing circumvention software).
4. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir., Feb 12, 2001).
5. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No 00-121 (W.D. Pa. filed Jan. 20, 2000);
National Football League v. TV Radio Now Corp. d/b/a iCraveTV, No. 00-120 (W.D. Pa. filed Jan. 20,
2000) (Case settled Jan. 28, 2000.  iCraveTV agreed to discontinue broadcasts unless Canadian law is
clarified to permit them. See Bloomberg News, Broadcasters pull the plug on iCraveTV, CNET
NEWS.COM  at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-1559907.html(Feb.  28, 2000).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
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product so that when a Streambox VCR contacts a RealNetworks server, the server
will think it is communicating with a RealPlayer, and will give the VCR access to
the works on the server.  Unlike the RealPlayer, however, the VCR will ignore the
Copy Switch, and therefore will make copies whether or not the copyright owner
has instructed the server to permit copying.  Thus, by emulating the “secret
handshake,” the VCR circumvents an access protection in violation of §1201(a)(2),
and by avoiding the Copy Switch, the VCR circumvents an anti copying measure in
violation of §1201(b), the court held.
Streambox invoked the §1201(c)(3) “no mandate” provision to resist the finding
of a §1201(b) violation.  Streambox claimed that §1201(c)(3) explicitly dispenses
producers of devices (including software) from any requirement to “respond” to a
technological measure.  In other words, if a technological measure will not prevent
access or copying unless another device works with it, there is no obligation to
conform that device to the technological measure even though the technological
measure will then be ineffective.  Thus, if the technological measure is a door that
will not lock until another device pushes it shut, §1201(c)(3) makes clear that
device designers are not obliged to produce a door-shutter.  By contrast, if the
technological measure is a door that is already locked, no further device is needed
to trigger its protective function.  Instead, a device is needed to open the door.
And, if one designs a skeleton key to open the door without permission, one has
violated §1201(a)(2).  In RealNetworks, the court found that the “secret handshake”
corresponded to the locked door and authorized key. Streambox argued, however,
that because the effectiveness of the Copy Switch depended on being read by a
RealPlayer, and could simply be ignored by another device, it was like an open
door that required a device to close it. Therefore, asserted Streambox, the Copy
Switch ran afoul of  §1203(c)(3), and was not protected against circumvention.
The court rejected this contention for two reasons.  First, by “ignoring” the Copy
Switch, the VCR “bypassed” or “avoided” it, in violation of §1201(b).  Second,
even if the Copy Switch required the cooperation of another device in order to close
out the possibility of making copies, the VCR would not have been able to “ignore”
the Copy Switch, had the VCR not first circumvented the access control by faking
the “secret handshake.”  To pursue the door metaphor, the VCR would not have
been able to ignore the instructions to close the Copy Switch door, had the VCR
not first used a skeleton key to open the “secret handshake” door.  The court
emphasized that §1201(c)(3) applies only “so long as such part or component, or
the product in which such part of component is integrated, does not otherwise fall
within the prohibitions of subsection (a)(2) or (b)(1)” (emphasis supplied).  Since
the VCR already violated §1201(a)(2) by emulating the “secret handshake,”
Streambox’ argument as to the proper characterization of the Copy Switch was
irrelevant.
Streambox next argued that the manufacture and distribution of the VCR should
be excused under Sony v. Universal City Studios7 since Streambox’ customers
could use the VCR to make “fair use copies.”  The court rejected the “fair use”
7. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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characterization of “private” copies made using the VCR.  The court stressed that
§1201 had superceded the Sony “merely capable of non infringing use”8 standard
for contributory infringement by manufacturers of devices used to make private
copies.  Even under the Sony analysis, observed the court, Streambox’ device could
not qualify.  The Sony court sustained the “fair use” nature of private analog copies
made to time shift television programs that the public had been invited to watch for
free.9  Moreover, many copyright owners expressed no objection to time shifting.
By contrast, emphasized the RealNetworks court, copyright owners had made clear
their objection to copying by keeping the Copy Switch turned off. The court might
also have noted that the “time shifting” justification does not apply to on demand
real time delivery of the copyrighted work; time shifting accommodates user
convenience when the consumer cannot view the work during its broadcast time.
With on demand real time delivery, there is no broadcast time; the user requests the
work when she is ready to hear it. Finally, it is worth observing that, while the
RealNetworks court rejected Streambox’ fair use arguments on the merits, the court
did not dismiss fair use defenses as inapplicable to anti circumvention claims.10
The court’s discussion of the relationship of the DMCA anti circumvention
provisions to private copying is significant.  In the court’s view, a copyright
owner’s imposition of technological measures precludes a private copying fair use
defense (at least for retention copies).  This seems correct, since, as the court
observed, the justifications for the defense no longer apply.  But, in addition to fair
use, a more specific section of the Copyright Act authorizes private copying of
audio recordings.  It is worth considering the relationship of this provision to
§1201.  Section 1008 of the Act, implemented as part of the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992, bars copyright infringement actions for “noncommercial
use by a consumer of a [digital audio recording] device or medium for making
digital musical recordings.”  The short answer in the RealNetworks context is that
RealNetworks sued Streambox not for contributory copyright infringement, but for
violation of the anti circumvention provisions of the Copyright Act.  Thus, even if
§1008 barred a copyright infringement claim against Streambox,11 an anti
circumvention claim remains available.12
8. Id. at 442.
9. Id. at 443, 446.
10. Cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) discussed
infra notes 13-35 and accompanying text.
11. It is not clear that Streambox VCR would, in any event, qualify as a “digital audio recording
device.”  See RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (MP3 playback
device that plays music recorded onto a memory card from a computer hard drive held not a “digital
audio recording device”).
12. Section 1201 may not trump §1008 as to use of a circumvention device to make private copies
of audio recordings.  While §1201(a) prohibits the act of circumventing an access control, §1201(b) does
not prohibit the act of circumventing an anti copy control.  Thus, if a consumer, having somehow
acquired a circumvention device, were to use it to make a digital audio private recording, it appears that
neither §1201(b) nor §106(1) would be violated unless private copying to acquire copies, as opposed to
make a convenience copy of a work of which one already owns a copy, was not “non commercial use.”
See discussion infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
RealNetworks brought another §1201(b) claim against the Streambox “Ripper,” a product that converted
GINSBURG-POSTMACRO.DOC 04/17/01  12:42 PM
2001] COPYRIGHT USE AND EXCUSE ON THE INTERNET 5
RealNetworks presented a rather straightforward controversy between two
Internet entrepreneurs.  RealNetworks had designed its business model to
accommodate copyright owners’ concerns, by making music available to end-users
on demand in real time, but in a format that did not permit users to copy and retain
the music files.  The other entrepreneur, Streambox, determined to give consumers
the copying facility that RealNetworks denied them, and sought to do this not by
reaching an agreement with the copyright owners, but by altering the feed from
RealNetworks’ servers.  Had Streambox persisted in its conduct, both copyright
owners and copyright-respectful intermediaries would have been compromised.
The award of a preliminary injunction thus bridled some entrepreneurial ingenuity
on the Web, an outcome that, in this instance, may favor the development of
legitimate copyright commerce on the Internet.
A more Wild West scenario, by contrast, may be playing out in the case of the
“DVD hack.”  In this case, the originator of the code used to decrypt DVDs was a
Norwegian teenager who developed the code, called DeCSS, ostensibly in order to
be able to play DVDs on a computer equipped with a Linux operating system.13
DVDs are encoded to run on DVD drives on computers equipped with Windows
operating systems.  The decrypted DVDs can run on any operating system, hence
the general appeal of the decryption code.  The code, originally posted from
Norway, soon found its way to many U.S. websites, some of which expressed
strongly negative views of copyright owners, and encouraged downloaders to copy
and share the contents of the decrypted DVDs.14 Several members of The Motion
Picture Association of America sought a preliminary injunction against three
website operators, including Eric Corley, a/k/a Emmanuel Goldstein, publisher of
the webpage “2600.com, the Hacker Quarterly.”  Although a preliminary injunction
was granted,15 and defendants removed the code from their sites, many more
websites (some perhaps directly incited by the defendants, others indirectly, acting
in sympathy with the defendants’ plight) took up the code, and, in what its
publisher called an act of “electronic civil disobedience,” 2600.com linked to these
RealAudio downloaded files to other formats, including MP3.  Starting from the premise that Ripper
worked on legitimate copies of RealAudio files, the court addressed Real Network’s claim that Ripper
was a circumvention device that made it possible to create derivative works, by converting RealAudio
files, which cannot be altered, to formats that can.  The court held that RealNetworks had not at the
preliminary injunction stage presented sufficient evidence as to the technological protection against the
making of derivative works, or as to the objections of copyright owners to the making of derivative
works.
13. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294 at 311.  The court,
however, discredited the teenager’s professed motive of Linux-compatibility: “Mr. Johansen is a very
talented young man and a member of a well known hacker group who viewed ‘cracking’ CSS as an end
in itself and a means of demonstrating his talent and who fully expected that the use of DeCSS would
not be confined to Linux machines.”  Id. at  320.
14. OpenDVD.org, at http://www.opendvd.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2001);  The Ultimate DeCSS
Resource Site, at http://www.pzcommunications.com/decss/links.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2001)
(listing all known links relevant to the DeCSS utility including sites which post the code) ; The Great
International DVD Source Code Distribution Contest, at  http://dvd.zgp.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2001); 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, at  http://www.eff.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
15. See 82 F. Supp.2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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sites.16  The court later granted a permanent injunction against both posting and
linking by 2600.com.  As a practical matter, it is unclear whether any legal remedy
can be effective in this situation.  Indeed, the studios may have won a legal battle,
but lost (or at least suffered a significant setback in) the public relations war, since
their pursuit of website operators may have cast them as greedy Goliaths out to
crush the happy hacking Davids.  Nonetheless, it is worth examining Universal
City Studios v. Reimerdes, for the legal issues it poses.
First, a fuller exposition of the facts.  The plaintiffs were eight major motion
picture studios who release movies initially for theatrical distribution, and then later
in “home video” formats, including DVD.  Plaintiffs employ the Content Scramble
System (CSS), an access control system that renders the DVD unviewable unless
played on a DVD player or drive containing the decryption key to access the
DVD’s content.  DVD sales exceed one million units per week.
DeCSS is a software utility that allows users to break the CSS protection system,
thus making it possible to access, copy, and distribute the contents of DVD movies
without permission, particularly with the aid of compression programs, such as
DivX, that significantly reduce the download time.17  The court found that, after
October 1999, when DeCSS first was distributed online, decrypted DVDs
compressed with DivX became available over the web for unauthorized
downloading.18
The court found that the plaintiff motion picture studios had made out a prima
facie case of violation of the §1201(a)(2) prohibition on the dissemination of
devices primarily designed to circumvent access controls.  The decryption code was
a “product,” “device” or “component” that was “primarily designed for the purpose
of circumventing” access controls.  Even if the reason for which the code was
originally devised was allegedly “Linux compatibility,” the court stressed that this
compatibility was achieved by circumvention, and thus came within the scope of
the statutory prohibition.  The court also expressed considerable skepticism
regarding the Linux argument; it observed that the DeCSS program makes it
possible to play DVDs whatever the operating system.19
The court turned next to the exceptions set forth in the DMCA to the prohibition
on distribution of devices designed to circumvent access controls.20  The most
16. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 312.
17. See id.  at 313-314.
18. See id. at 315.
19. See also supra, note 13.
20. At the preliminary injunction stage, one defendant sought shelter under the ISP liability
limitation provisions of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  The court rejected this contention for two
reasons.  First, the defendant offered no proof that it was a service provider as defined in the ISP liability
section.  (In fact, that defendant could not have been a service provider as defined because defendant
posted the content itself, it did not merely host someone else’s posting.)  Second, that provision limits
liability only for copyright infringement, and a violation of §1201(a)(2) is technically not copyright
infringement, it is a distinct violation.  The court might also have noted that the defendant had
knowledge of the content and purpose of the posted material and therefore, even had plaintiffs claimed
copyright infringement, and even had the defendant been deemed a service provider, the defendant
would not have qualified for the liability limitation.  See id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
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likely of these appeared to be §1201(f)’s authorization of circumvention to permit
reverse engineering in order to create interoperable computer programs, since
DeCSS had allegedly been created in order to permit DVDs to play on Linux-
operated drives.  The court nonetheless held that defendants did not qualify for the
§1201(f) exemption.  First, the court observed that the defendant website operators
had not themselves reverse engineered CSS, nor did they create the “interoperable”
DeCSS program; these defendants were simply disseminating the code devised by
the Norwegian teenager, Jon Johansen.  Section 1201(f) has nothing to do with
those who disseminate downstream the fruits of another’s reverse engineering;
§1201(f) is for the benefit of the reverse engineer herself, provided she otherwise
qualifies for the exemption.
Even had defendants originated DeCSS, the court continued, the reverse
engineering still would fail to meet §1201(f) criteria: since DeCSS also runs under
Windows, Linux compatibility was not its “sole purpose,” as required by the
DMCA. More importantly, the legislative history made clear that the reverse
engineering exception was added to permit circumvention of access controls on
computer programs in order to promote the creation of new computer programs, not
to promote circumvention of access controls on motion pictures.  The court stressed
that the computer code written to circumvent an access protection was meant to be
an intermediate step toward writing a new computer program that would be
interoperable with the circumvented program (or with other programs).  The
statutory objective was to permit writing and disseminating the new program or the
product incorporating the new program, not to disseminate the circumvention
program that made it possible to acquire the information necessary to write the new
program.21
Finally, the court might also have observed that defendants’ invocation of the
reverse engineering exception seems peculiar for another reason: If §1201(f) is
properly applied, the program that results from the reverse engineering does not
itself circumvent access controls, and downstream distributors therefore should
suffer no exposure under §1201(a)(2).
The court rejected two other DMCA exemptions, encryption research under
1201(g), and security testing under § 1201(j).  Neither of these exemptions are
licenses to hack, and defendants failed to meet the provisions’ stringent good faith
requirements.
The court also dismissed defendants’ invocation of the fair use defense, finding
that fair use is a defense to copyright infringement, not to circumvention of access
controls.  The court reviewed the text and legislative history to the DMCA, and
21. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d  at 320 and n. 30.  Arguably,
the limitation of §1201(f) to the dissemination of the end-results disfavors production of the best
compatible programs or products, because those who would attempt to create these programs or
products will not have access to the hack that unlocks the information necessary to producing the end
results.  Proponents of the free software movement would advocate making generally available any
elements that lead to the creation of these programs, including the predicate hack.  This contention,
notwithstanding its apparent appeal to some programmers, seems to me rather dog-wagging.  I thank
Eben Moglen for explaining the hacker argument.
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concluded that Congress intentionally declined to incorporate a fair use defense to
anti circumvention violations.  Although the anti circumvention provision of the
DMCA states: “Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or
defenses applicable to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title,”22
this reservation is arguably irrelevant, since the statute makes access circumvention
a violation distinct from copyright infringement.23  Moreover, stressed the court,
Congress recognized the contention, voiced by a range of constituencies concerned
with the legislation, that technological controls on access to copyrighted works
might erode fair use by preventing access even for uses that would be deemed
“fair” if only access might be gained.  And it struck a balance among the competing
interests.24
Elements of that balance include Congress’ direction to the Librarian of
Congress to conduct a rulemaking to determine whether noninfringing users of
works “are likely to be adversely affected by the prohibition” on circumvention of
access controls, and, accordingly, to publish classes of works to exempt from the
prohibition,25 and the provision for a variety of exceptions to the access right
explicitly set out in §§1201(d)-(j).  Under the court’s reading, either the work is
protected against circumvention of access controls for any purpose other than those
set forth in the specific exemptions, or the use is exempted by those provisions;
indeterminate defenses, such as the highly contextual fair use privilege, do not fit in
this scheme.  If the statute lacks the user-friendly nuance of the fair use doctrine,
contended the court, Congress intended that result:
[t]he policy concerns raised by defendants were considered by Congress.  Having
considered them, Congress crafted a statute that, so far as the applicability of the fair
use defense to Section 1201(a) claims is concerned, is crystal clear.  In such
circumstances, courts may not undo what Congress has so plainly done by
“construing” the words of the statute to accomplish a result that Congress rejected.26
Is it so “plain” that Congress has left no room for a fair use defense to an access
code anti circumvention violation?  The syntax of §1201(c) permits an argument
that the phrase “including fair use,” as set off in commas, modifies not “defenses
applicable to copyright infringement,” but “limitations...under this title.”  Section
1201 is under Title 17, even if it is not, technically, a provision addressed to
copyright infringement.27  If fair use is a general limitation on rights set out in Title
22. Id. §1201(c)(1).
23. See id. § 1203 (authorizing civil action and stating remedies for violation of anti
circumvention provisions); accord, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp.2d 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing fair use defense on the ground that fair use does not apply to violations of §
1201(a)); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 673, 729 (2000) (“[T]he WIPO Treaties Act adds a wholly separate tort of unauthorized
circumvention, to which the fair use defense is inapplicable.”).
24. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 322 and n.162.
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(D).
26. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 324.
27. I am grateful to Professor Jessica Litman for drawing my attention to §1201(c)(1)’s syntax and
its consequences, and for prompting the analysis that follows.
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17, including, for example, the (technically) extra-copyright right to fix
performances of musical works set out in § 1101,28 then § 1201(c) preserves fair
use as to anti-circumvention as well.  This argument works if one concludes that
fair use is not merely a statutory rule expressed in § 107 of the Copyright Act, but
that it is a general judge-made rule applicable to rights within the penumbra of
copyright, as well as to other intellectual property rights, including trademarks.29
Congress codified copyright fair use in § 107, but Congress disavowed any intent
to “freeze” this judge-made doctrine, “especially during a period of rapid
technological change.”30  By the same token, one might contend, Congress did not
intend to limit the development of fair use to rights formally within the Copyright
Act (as opposed to Title 17 in general, or even other statutory intellectual property
rights).  Because fair use is a “general equitable defense,”31 one might conclude
that courts may – given an appropriate fact situation – apply it to §1201(a) by
articulating additional, and highly contextual, limitations on the prohibition on
circumvention of access controls.  The DeCSS controversy, however, given the
court’s findings concerning the defendant’s general disrespect for legal rules and
property rights32 did not present a sympathetic case for interpolating a fair use
limitation.
Finally, the court rejected defendants’ invocation of the First Amendment.
Although the court recognized that computer code can be expressive, it stressed
that DeCSS “has a distinctly functional, non-speech aspect in addition to reflecting
the thoughts of the programmers.”33  While Congress may not prohibit speech
based on the content of the message, it may in furtherance of an important
governmental objective regulate non-speech functionality, even if that regulation
impinges on the program’s expressive aspects.  The important objective at issue
was the assurance of meaningful copyright protection as an incentive to continued
creation and dissemination of works.  The characteristics of the digital world,
especially its fostering of instantaneous copying and dissemination, enhance the
likelihood that circumvention programs will lead to massive copying:
“dissemination of means of circumventing access controls to copyrighted works
threatens to produce virtually unstoppable infringement of copyright.”34  Because
28. For example, where § 1101 applies to communication to the public of the sounds of an
unauthorized recording of a musical performance, and contains no explicit fair use or educational
performance exceptions, one could imagine a reasonable fair use argument on behalf of a music
professor who plays a bootleg recording of Maria Callas in an opera appreciation course.
29. Courts have entertained “nominative fair use” defenses to trademark infringement, and may be
developing broader concepts of non-statutory but lawful unauthorized use of trademarks.  See, e.g., New
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F. 2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).  In addition, one scholar has
argued for extending the fair use doctrine to patent law.  See Maureen O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of
Patent Fair Use, 100 COLUM. L. REV.  1177 (2000).
30. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
31. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
32. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2 at 308-309, 312-313(citing
2600.com articles on “how to steal an Internet domain name, access other people’s e-mail, intercept
cellular phone calls, and break into the computer systems at Costco stores and Federal Express”).
33. Id. at 329.
34. Id. at 332.
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the legislation targets the program’s functional, rather than expressive, aspects, and
“there is no other practical means of preventing infringement through use of the
programs,”35 §1201(a) survives constitutional scrutiny, the court held.
II. LINKING AND LIABILITY
Although plaintiffs initially brought the §1201(a) claim against three websites
that had posted DeCSS, the studios subsequently amended the complaint to seek
relief against 2600.com’s linking to non-party sites that were still carrying DeCSS.
The linking claim carries significant, and troublesome, implications.  From the
copyright owners’ point of view, obtaining an injunction against a few website
operators yields at best a Pyrrhic victory, if the infringing (or circumventing)
content can simply be transferred to other sites, whose locations can be pinpointed
by means of links.  From a wider perspective, however, injunctions against links
may be overbroad, sweeping in not only bad actors who seek to facilitate
circumvention or infringement, but also those who seek to call attention to the
debate concerning the condemned content.  At the same time, even if an injunction
sweeps too broadly, it may nonetheless prove fruitless, as a proliferation of links
and mirror sites may elude effective pursuit.
In its decision awarding a permanent injunction, the Reimerdes court determined
that the provision of links to sites that automatically download the code was the
functional equivalent of delivering the code itself, and thus came within the
§1201(a)(2) prohibition on “trafficking” in circumvention devices.  The court found
no meaningful difference with respect to links to sites whose sole content is the
code, and that give users the option of downloading, rather than automatically
sending it.  The court stressed defendant’s knowledge of the destination and
purpose of these links: before posting the links, 2600.com had verified that the sites
in fact were posting DeCSS, and had then drawn 2600.com’s users’ attention to the
availability of DeCSS through these links.  The court acknowledged that the
“trafficking” characterization could become problematic if the links were to sites
that not only contained DeCSS, but also other content, such as a news report
covering the controversy.  But, the court noted, links of that kind were not at issue
in this case.
The court’s distinction between sites (and, implicitly, pinpointed pages), whose
sole purpose is to disseminate DeCSS, and sites that include the code as part of a
broader discussion focuses on the purpose of the site, rather than on the purpose of
the linker.  In Reimerdes, in any event, the court found that purpose was clear, to
foster dissemination of DeCSS through other means once it could no longer
directly offer the code itself.  But what if a non-party to the original action
pinpoints DeCSS on other sites, albeit for purposes other than to encourage
downloading?  For example, the webpage for my Spring 2000 Copyright course36
35. Id. at 333.
36. DVD decryption litigation, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L6341_001/
circumv.shtml (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
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contains links to a variety of documents in the Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes
case, including to the plaintiffs’ complaint and legal memoranda, to the court’s
preliminary injunction opinion, and to several websites that discuss the case.  Some
of these discussion sites are quite hostile, and include links to other sites that carry
the DeCSS code, or that invite websurfers to revenge themselves on greedy
copyright owners by downloading, mirroring, and further disseminating DeCSS.
Have these links made me a “trafficker” in circumvention devices?  Or suppose one
of my links sends students and other users to a site from which they may download
decrypted, compressed motion pictures?  I include that link not to encourage piracy
of The Matrix (one of the films the Reimerdes court found had been posted on
unauthorized websites), but to demonstrate how easy it has become to obtain
unauthorized copies of decrypted DVDs.  (The latter link does not in fact appear on
my website.)  Have I become contributorily liable for copyright infringement for
facilitating my students’ access to infringing copies?
Lest this inquiry seem fanciful, consider the following decision concerning
contributory copyright infringement by means of pointing to sites carrying the
challenged content.  In Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry,37
Defendant Utah Lighthouse Ministry [ULM], an organization critical of certain
Mormon Church teachings, posted without permission on the ULM website
approximately seventeen pages from plaintiff’s 160-page Church Handbook of
Instructions.  Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.  The TRO was granted, and ULM took down the material.
Subsequently, the defendants posted a notice on their web site informing visitors
that the Handbook was available online at three other web sites and listing those
web site addresses. The notice stated “Church Handbook of Instructions is back
online!”  It further posted e-mails that encouraged users to visit those web sites, to
print copies of the material, and to send the material to others, including to the
media.  Moreover, in response to an e-mail from a websurfer who had had
difficulty accessing one of the other web sites, defendants provided further
instructions on how to access them.  The court noted that one of the web sites to
which defendants directed browsers stated “Please mirror these files...It will be a
LOT quicker for you to download the compressed version...Needless to say, we
need a LOT of mirror sites, as absolutely soon as possible.”
Since the defendants no longer posted the allegedly infringing content
themselves, but pointed users to other sites from which the users could directly
view the content, the court confronted the question whether ULM could be held
contributorily liable for copyright infringement.  ULM apparently did not direct or
encourage the other sites to post the pages from the Church Handbook.  Because
there is no secondary liability without primary infringing conduct, the first issue
was whether reading the church documents online (even assuming users did not
download and retain copies) was itself infringing.  Citing the doctrine of RAM
copying enunciated in MAI Systems v. Peak Computer,38 the court held that the
37. 75 F. Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
38. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
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temporary entry into the memories of visitors’ computers – the act that permitted
the documents to be read online – constituted the primary infringement.  The court
did not consider whether the fair use doctrine might have excused a prima facie
primary infringement.
Applying the standard for contributory infringement,39 the court held that ULM
supplied users with the means (the URLs of the websites posting the material) to
commit the primary infringement, and, by inciting users to enter those addresses to
get to sites where the content could be found, knew that users would employ those
means to commit the infringements (to read online).
If this result seems frightening, it is probably because the court gave no
consideration to the fair use (and First Amendment) concerns underlying the
dispute.  If the primary conduct should not have been deemed infringing, then
pointing users to sites where the documents could be read could not have given rise
to liability either.  Listing URLs, or, going the next step, linking, presents a harder
case when the primary conduct is infringing.  Arguably, the link is merely a
reference, like a footnote, and no one (one hopes) would contend that a footnote
identifying where an allegedly infringing work may be found makes its author
contributorily liable for copyright infringement.40  But the analogy may be too
facile.  Few readers are likely in fact to pursue the footnoted reference, and fewer
still to make copies of the referenced work.  A link not only vastly facilitates
following up the reference, but also facilitates copying.  Without entering into the
debate whether reading online is or should be prima facie copyright infringement,41
one can acknowledge that once the document is posted, any websurfer may not
only read it, but also copy and further disseminate it (assuming a technological
protection does not limit downstream copying).  Perhaps this is only a difference in
degree, since a conventional footnote could at least in theory initiate the same chain
of events.  Nonetheless, the enormously enhanced volume of the activity that a link
permits could well convert an activity that in modest dimensions seems clearly a
fair use into one that plausibly could compromise the market for the copied work.42
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the test for a deleterious effect on the
potential market for a work focuses on whether the activity at issue, “if it should
become widespread” would harm the potential market.43  The ability of digital
media to promote widespread linking to and downloading from unauthorized
copies arguably leads the activity afoul of fair use.
39. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971).
40. See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Copyright Decision Threatens Freedom to Link, CYBER L.J., Dec.
10, 1999 at ¶ 22, at http://channel.nytimes.com/1999/12/10/technology/10law.html (quoting Professor
Jessica Litman, drawing footnote analogy).  But see David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Copyright
and the Web: An Emerging Double Standard, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 2000, at 3 (criticizing footnote analogy).
41. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29
(1994).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
43. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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That said, this argument may prove too much.  The argument considers the
possibility that linking may enhance unlawful copying, without fairly taking into
account the likelihood that the copying will in fact occur.44  The argument also fails
to address the purpose for which the link was supplied: was the linker encouraging
downloading, or instead is the link informational or for purposes of criticism?
After all, if an electronic newspaper covering a copyright infringement case linked
to a defendant’s site, it might be facilitating unlawful copying, but it is also
documenting the debate.
Let us return to my course webpage.  Under Utah Lighthouse, would I be liable
for a contributory circumvention violation?  I am supplying a means to send my
students and others who access my course page to sites from which they may
download DeCSS.  I may anticipate that some number of those I send will avail
themselves of that opportunity (and will consequently decrypt, and perhaps pirate,
DVDs).  On the other hand, unlike ULM, I was not a party to the original lawsuit; I
did not originate an infringing posting, and then arguably effect an “end run”
around the prohibition of my posting to send my surfers to sites where they could
obtain what I could no longer give them.45  Moreover, my purpose in including the
links was to call attention to the debate over the DVD hack, not to incite surfers to
download the code.  Under the standard announced in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sony v. Universal City Studios,46 I am not a contributory infringer if I
distribute a staple article of commerce which, despite its potential to be used for
infringing purposes, is commonly used for, indeed is merely capable of, substantial
non infringing uses.  Under that standard, since my links are capable of being used
for the non-infringing purpose of eliciting discussion about DVD controls, I would
not be liable.
The “merely capable” standard does not, however, apply if I am not distributing
a staple article of commerce, but am distributing something tailored to my
customers’ infringing purposes.47  Since my links are not general search tools such
as thesauri,48 but were written specifically to pinpoint particular sites, it is not clear
that a court would analogize my links to a staple article of commerce.  On the other
hand, if I could show that my announced purpose of stimulating debate was not a
mere pretext for encouraging unauthorized circumvention, but that most of my
webpage users are following the links for purposes consistent with the educational
purposes for which I posted them, then I ought not to be held a contributory
infringer.  If this conclusion is reassuring to those who value free speech and fair
44. For a fuller development of this objection, see Jessica Litman, The Demonization of Piracy,at
http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/demon.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
45. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d 1290, 1295 (D.
Utah 1999) (ULM’s posting of links permits defendants to achieve objective of original posting of
content).
46. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
47. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
48. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (limitation of liability for service providers whose “information
location tools” can lead to sites carrying infringing content).
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use, it remains troubling to the extent that, however noble the motivation for
posting links to infringing or circumventing sites, the links do furnish a means for
the unscrupulous (or for the militant converts to the “information wants to be free”
credo) to circumvent or infringe copyrighted works.
If distinctions based on the purpose of the link or of the site will not work in
practice, and if links and unauthorized sites will proliferate in any event, is it
fruitless to enjoin even those links, – such as those at issue in Utah Lighthouse and
Reimerdes – posted for the purpose of eluding a prior order to take down infringing
or circumventing content?  The Reimerdes defendants contended that injunctive
relief would be futile, akin to locking the barn door after the horse has fled.  The
court rejected this contention for two reasons.  First, acknowledging the practical
futility argument will simply encourage more aggressive use of the Internet to
undermine the value of copyrighted works, the court warned.  Second, whatever the
conduct of non-parties, the defendants have themselves caused irreparable harm,
and are within the court’s remedial power.  It would be perverse, the court
observed, to withhold relief against defendants on the ground that they have made
it impossible, or at least very difficult, to obtain meaningful enforcement on a
broader scale.  Rather than conceding its powerlessness, the court proclaimed
the likelihood is that this decision will serve notice on others that “the strong right arm
of equity” may be brought to bear against them absent a change in their conduct and
thus contribute to a climate of appropriate respect for intellectual property rights in an
age in which the excitement of ready access to untold quantities of information has
blurred in some minds the fact that taking what is not yours and not freely offered to
you is stealing.49
Whether the court’s hopeful pronouncement proves true may well depend at
least in part on how far the “blurring” has progressed beyond the hacker
community to the general Internet-using population.  This is an issue to which we
shall return in the context of the Napster controversy, addressed later in this
Article.
A.  ANOTHER SEARCH TOOL CONTROVERSY
Another recent search tool controversy, Kelly v. Arriba Soft,50 involved a search
engine designed to identify and gather images posted on webpages.  The defendant
did not seek the permission of the copyright owners of the images that appeared on
defendant’s index.  Rather, the defendant, and the court, seem to have drawn
inspiration from the advertising campaign of the New York City Yellow Pages: “If
it’s out there, it’s in here,” modified to: “If it’s out there, it can be in my web
index.”  In this case, however, the “it” was not merely a reference to the homepage
where the information, here images, could be found, but reduced-size copies of the
images themselves.  Plaintiff’s claims alleged both copyright infringement, and
49. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
50. 77 F. Supp. 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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violation of the DMCA §1202 prohibition on the removal of copyright management
information.
Plaintiff Kelly was a photographer specializing in the “California gold rush
country.”  One of his two websites sponsored “virtual tours” of the “gold rush
country,” promoting plaintiff’s book on the topic; the other marketed corporate
retreats in “gold rush country.”  Defendant Arriba Soft (now operating as
“Ditto.com”) devised a “visual search engine” for the Internet.  Unlike other
Internet search engines, defendant’s lists of web sites displayed images, rather than
text.  In response to users’ queries, the search engine would display a list of
reduced “thumbnail size” pictures from the indexed sites.  The user could then click
onto any thumbnail image in order to see the “image attributes window,” which
enlarged the image to its full size, described its dimensions, and listed the
originating web site’s address.  The user could click onto the address to link to the
originating web site to obtain the terms and conditions for the photograph’s use.51
The search engine operated from a database of around two million thumbnail
images that were automatically retrieved by its “crawler,” which indiscriminately
searched the web for images to convert into “thumbnail sized” versions for
inclusion in the index.  The retrieved images were stored briefly in full on
defendant’s server, but were deleted once the thumbnail image was made.  After
the images were gathered, defendant’s employees screened images for relevant and
appropriate content.  In addition, defendant’s web site included a notice to users on
a separate page labeled “Copyright,” that images shown may be subject to use
restrictions, and instructing users to check with the originating web sites before
copying or using the images.
In January 1999, thirty-five of plaintiff’s images were indexed by defendant’s
crawler and added to its database, ultimately making the images available in
“thumbnail form” to defendant’s users.  Plaintiff sent defendant a notice of
copyright infringement in January 1999.  Defendant removed the images from its
database; technical problems nonetheless caused the images to reappear several
times thereafter.  Plaintiff initiated suit in April.
Although the court found a prima facie violation, the court also held that under
the circumstances, the unauthorized reproduction of plaintiff’s images constituted
fair use.  In addition, the court held that defendant did not violate the DMCA by
displaying plaintiff’s images without their copyright management information.
Both of the holdings are disturbing.  The court’s fair use analysis distorts the judge-
made doctrine of “transformative use”; its analysis of §1202, if faithful to the text,
illustrates the practical weakness of that provision.
As to the first factor, the court found defendant’s use to be commercial, but
reasoned that the use was of a “more incidental and less exploitative nature than
51. Defendant modified the operation of its search engine between the time of the alleged
infringement and the time the case was adjudicated.  Initially, the full-sized image was not technically
located on defendant’s web site, but was displayed by opening a link to the plaintiff’s webpage.  None of
the other webpage content (such as terms and conditions of use) appeared, however.  In the later version
of defendant’s search engine, when the user clicks on the thumbnail sketch, the full-size image appears,
as does the originating webpage in full.
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more traditional types of ‘commercial use.’”52  The court distinguished between the
web site itself, which defendant operated for commercial purposes, and the search
engine, which the court deemed commercial only in its connection to the website,
that is, that the index’ primary purpose was to facilitate thorough results for its
users.  (The court did not, however, consider whether the thoroughness of the
results may have enhanced the appeal of defendant’s website to advertisers.)  The
court distinguished a hypothetical clearly commercial use of plaintiff’s images to
advertise defendant’s website from the “unusual and less serious” “indiscriminate”
use of plaintiff’s images, along with all other images, in defendant’s
“comprehensive thumbnail index.”53
Most significantly to the court, the defendant’s use was transformative because
it was very “different” from the plaintiff’s intended use: while plaintiff created his
photographs for artistic or “aesthetic” purposes, defendant reproduced and
displayed the photographs for “functional” purposes of identifying their existence
and location.  The purpose here was to organize and provide access to images on
the Internet.  The court acknowledged that the version of defendant’s index used
during the period at issue in this case permitted users to view and potentially
download full-size images without contacting the plaintiff’s web page.  As a result,
the index was “less clearly connected to the engine’s purpose of finding and
organizing Internet content for users.”54  Nonetheless, the court found that the
transformative purpose of a “new enterprise” outweighed the “imperfect means of
achieving that purpose” in an evolving technology55: “Defendant’s purposes were
and are inherently transformative, even if its realization of those purposes was at
times imperfect.”56
As for the remaining fair use factors, the court found that the nature of the
copyrighted work weighed in plaintiff’s favor, as did, “slightly,” the amount and
substantiality of the portion used.  Although the thumbnail images on the index
reproduced and displayed plaintiff’s photographs in full, their size was greatly
reduced, and, at least in the later version of the index, the thumbnails could not be
enlarged.  The nature of the use, indexing images, required reproduction of the full
image; partial reproductions would not capture the full indexed content.  With
respect to the earlier version of the index, however, the court found that displaying
a full-sized version of the image without returning the viewer to plaintiff’s web site
was more problematic because it was not necessary to the main purposes of
defendant’s search engine (as identified above – “to catalogue and improve access
to images on the Internet.”)
Finally, the court held that defendant’s index did not compromise the potential
market for or value of plaintiff’s works.  Significantly, the court identified the
relevant market as “Plaintiff’s Web sites as a whole,”57 rather than the separate
52. Kelly, 77 F. Supp.2d at 1119.
53. Id. at 1119 and n.5.
54. Id. at1119.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1121.
57. Id. at 1120.
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photographs. The court found the images were used to promote plaintiff’s products
sold on the sites, and to attract users to other advertisements on those sites.  The
court acknowledged that it was possible that some users might copy images from
defendant’s site, and further, that “deep-linking” allowed users to by-pass the
advertisements on plaintiff’s site, but held that plaintiff did not present any
evidence of harm or adverse impact from these practices.
The court’s fair use discussion appears to be guided by exceptional solicitude for
new Internet enterprises.  As David Goldberg and Robert Bernstein have pointed
out, a hard copy image repository does not enjoy a fair use privilege to reproduce
and disseminate the copyrighted images that it catalogues.58  There is nothing
“transformative” about taking an image, and reproducing it in full as is.  The image
is not incorporated into a new work that builds or comments on the nature or
qualities of the copied work.59  That the image is conveyed through digital rather
than analog means is not itself transformative; “transformative” use addresses the
message, not the medium.  Here there was no message, other than reiteration of
plaintiff’s works.  The court’s bedazzlement by the Internet is also apparent from
the remarkable tolerance it expressed for the “imperfect” way (i.e., by means of
excessive copying) in which defendant achieved its so-called transformative
objective.  It seems unlikely that a “new enterprise” in the hard copy world would
enjoy a privilege to copy too much during the initial stages of its business simply
because the business was a start-up that proposed a useful product.
The court’s analysis of the fourth factor is similarly problematic.  By identifying
plaintiff’s works as its websites as a whole, rather than as the individual
photographs, the court was able to ignore the economic impact on plaintiff’s ability
to license rights in the photographs independently of the websites in which they
appeared.  But when a copyrighted work comprises several components, each of
them works of authorship, the appropriate analysis of the impact on the potential
market for the work considers the potential market for the components, taken
separately, as well as for the work as a whole.60
For all the shortcomings of the court’s analysis, the result might have been
justified on more conventional fair use terms.  The purpose of defendant’s index,
while commercial and not transformative with respect to the images, was
58. See Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 40.
59. Cf. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996);
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), further amended 1995
(photocopying chapters from books for inclusion in course packs, or articles from journals for
researchers files is not transformative).  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417 (1984) the Supreme Court acknowledged that taking an entire work for its intrinsic purpose (there to
record a televised motion picture for subsequent viewing) was not fatal to the fair use claim, when the
use was non commercial, and the public had been invited to view the films for free on broadcast
television.  Here, plaintiff’s use was commercial, and the public’s invitation to view the images on
plaintiff’s website was accompanied by terms and conditions that defendant did not reproduce with the
images.
60. See, e.g., American Geophysical, 60 F.3d 913 (each article within a journal should be
considered a separate work); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(potential market for licensing “first serial” rights to book).
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nonetheless a useful one, perhaps akin to the “research” uses cited in the preamble
to the fair use section as examples of the kinds of uses that typically may be found
non infringing (if they meet the statutory criteria).  The resolution of the case
should have turned on a sustained analysis of the fourth factor: impact on the
potential market for the photographs.  The initial version of the index offered users
the opportunity to enlarge and copy plaintiff’s images, without contacting
plaintiff’s website.  This version does seem to substitute for plaintiff’s market for
the images, and should not have been held excused.  By contrast, the later version
of the index delivered only “thumbnail” size images, sufficient to convey the
content, but unable to be enlarged.  For enlargements and further copies, the later
version of the index sent users back to the plaintiff’s website.  This version seems
considerably less in tension with plaintiff’s licensing of the images...except to an
image bank.  So the question would depend on licensing practices in the industry
with respect to uses of defendant’s kind.61  If defendant’s use is informative
without usurping, indeed, if it facilitates transactions with the plaintiff by
automatically sending users from the thumbnail to plaintiff’s website, then fair use
might properly be found.
Defendant’s incorporation of thumbnails of plaintiff’s images presented another
problem: the thumbnails did not include the copyright management information
that appeared in the text of plaintiff’s web site because defendant’s “crawler”
retrieved only the plaintiff’s images.  Plaintiff therefore alleged a violation of
§1202(b), which prohibits the removal of copyright management information in
certain circumstances.  Defendant attempted to compensate for the non-inclusion of
copyright management information by providing a separate “copyright” page for
users to click open, on which defendant warned users about potential copyright
restrictions.
The court held that plaintiff failed to establish a violation of §1202(b)(1)
because plaintiff had not embedded the copyright management information in the
images themselves, but had included it elsewhere on his webpages.  As a result, the
court determined that defendant’s copying of the images did not remove any
copyright management information from plaintiff’s works.  (This holding is
arguably inconsistent with the court’s earlier determination that plaintiff’s “works”
were the webpages, not the separate photographs.)  In addition, the court held that
defendant did not intentionally omit copyright management information. The court
further found that the defendant did not violate the §1201(b)(3) prohibition on
distribution of copies of works knowing that copyright management information
has been removed.  Although defendant displayed plaintiff’s images out of the
context of their web sites, in thumbnail (and, initially, in full-sized) versions,
without their copyright management information, the court stressed defendant’s
provision of the name of the originating web site, a link for getting there, and a
notice about potential copyright infringement.  As a result, ruled the court,
defendant did not have “reasonable grounds to know” that it could cause users to
61. Cf. American Geophysical, 60 F.3d 913 (photocopy licenses granted by Copyright Clearance
Center).
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infringe the copyrights.  Moreover, the court found that plaintiff’s images are
vulnerable to user infringement by virtue of their location on the web, and that
defendant did not heighten plaintiff’s vulnerability.
The court’s last observation may be the key to its resolution not only of the
copyright management information issue, but also of the fair use question:
Anything that a copyright owner puts out on the Internet is fair game (at least if it is
not accompanied by a technological protection measure).  This is unfortunate not
only for copyright owners, and for the development of legitimate business on the
web, but also, ultimately for users, once the euphoria of “free” access to “free
information” has subsided.  With respect to the court’s analysis of §1202(b), the
statute itself may be more problematic than the court’s treatment of it.  The court
did misconstrue the statute in holding that defendant did not remove copyright
management information from plaintiff’s works when the information was located
on another part of plaintiff’s webpage.  Section 1202 does not require that the
information be embedded in the photographs; the definition of copyright
management information covers information “conveyed in connection with copies
or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work, including in
digital form....”62  The appearance of the information on the webpage should have
sufficed to meet the “in connection with” standard.  But even if the court wrongly
interpreted §1202 as to this issue, the result nonetheless seems consonant with the
statute.  Under §1202(b), the wrongful act is not simply removing the information,
or distributing or publicly performing the work without the information.63  The
statute also requires that those who distribute or perform the work have known that
the information was removed without the copyright owner’s authorization, and that
those who remove the information, or who distribute or perform works whose
information has been removed, do so “knowing, or...having reasonable grounds to
know that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any right
under this title.”  Defendant may have intentionally removed the information, by
deliberately separating the images from the information on plaintiff’s webpage, and
defendant therefore would have known that the images it communicated lacked the
information.  Nonetheless, it would be difficult to prove that defendant knew or had
reasonable grounds to know that its acts would promote copyright infringement,
particularly when the later version of defendant’s index sent users from the
thumbnails back to plaintiff’s own webpage, on which the information did appear.
This analysis illustrates the relative weakness of §1202’s protection of copyright
management information: even intentional removal is not unlawful if the copyright
owner cannot show that the removal would encourage or facilitate copyright
infringement.  In many cases, removal of the information would not promote
infringement – although it could make licensing more onerous – because users are
not entitled to infer lack of copyright coverage from the absence of copyright
62. 17 U.S.C. §1202(c).
63. Curiously, §1202(b)(3) does not address publicly displaying a work whose copyright
management information has been removed.
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management information.64  Section 1202 therefore may require a rather high
threshold of bad faith before a violation is established.  On the facts of Kelly v.
Arriba Soft, the weakness of §1202 seems less troublesome, because users did
encounter plaintiff’s copyright management information, at least in the later version
of the index, which sent users directly to plaintiff’s webpage.  But if copyright
management information-less copies circulate without the link to their proprietor’s
information, then the goals of a copyright management information system – to
facilitate licensing and legitimate use – will be frustrated, despite the absence of a
violation of §1202.
B. MORE ON FAIR USE AND COPYING FROM THE INTERNET
Another recent decision to consider copying from websites expressed far less
tolerance for unlicensed postings.  In Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,65 the
Central District of California rejected the fair use defense of the Free Republic
regarding copying and posting articles from the L.A.Times and Washington Post to
its website.  Plaintiffs asserted that the copying was non transformative, and
harmed the actual and potential markets for their websites, both by diverting
readers from viewing plaintiffs’ advertising-supported pages, and by making
available for free the text of less current articles otherwise available only through
plaintiffs’ fee-based archive pages.  The Free Republic claimed that the posting of
full text articles copied verbatim was necessary to its critical purpose of inviting
commentary by its readers concerning the alleged political bias of the reporting in
the copied articles.  Although the Free Republic did not itself comment on the
copied articles, it claimed that its solicitation of readership response met the
“transformative” purpose favored by the fair use doctrine.
The court rejected the “transformative” characterization of defendant’s copying.
Defendants simply made the articles available to a different audience; audience-
shifting is not transformative, even if the new audience is invited to read the articles
with a particularly critical eye.  Moreover, even if the readers’ critical comments
might have retroactively transformed defendant’s postings, not all the postings
attracted comments, and those that did drew comments on the topics, not on the
reporting itself.  The court observed that it was not necessary to copy entire articles
in order to comment on their subject matter; that could be achieved by posting
summaries of the articles.
The court also emphasized that in a networked environment, there is less need to
copy, because would-be commentators can link to the documents they seek to
criticize.  The Free Republic objected that linking can be cumbersome, or no longer
free, once the targeted article has been archived.  The court was not persuaded:
[t]hat [there is a charge] does not make linking plaintiffs’ websites to the Free
Republic site “impractical.”  It merely requires that Free Republic visitors pay a
64. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (notice of copyright is optional).
65. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
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fee for viewing plaintiff’s articles just as other members of the public do… The
fact that linking...is not as easy or convenient for Free Republic users as full text
posting does not render the practice a fair use.66
Regarding the fourth fair use factor, harm to potential markets for the work, the
court found that visits to the Free Republic site substituted for visits to plaintiffs’.
Defendants claimed that, although their site received millions of “hits” each month,
the impact of their postings was de minimis, and that plaintiffs could not prove that
the Free Republic site resulted in revenue lost to plaintiffs.  The court emphasized
that their copyrights gave plaintiffs “the ‘right to control’ access to the articles, and
defendants’ activities affect a market plaintiffs currently seek to exploit.”67
Moreover, were defendants’ practice of full text copying to become widespread,68
the market impact would be substantial.  It is worth noting that the court recognized
that markets created by new forms of copying remain within the copyright owners’
“right to control,” even when the copyright owners’ own exploitation of those
markets may not be fully developed, and even when the defendants’ incursion,
taken in isolation, may seem modest.
Finally, the court rejected defendants’ first amendment defense.  The court
stressed that the fair use doctrine accommodates first amendment concerns, and
that, in view of the availability of linking, and the possibility of summarizing
plaintiffs’ articles, defendants had not shown a need to post full text copies.
Together, Free Republic and Kelly v. Arriba Soft propose conflicting directions
for Internet-specific fair use.  Kelly indicates that web availability may make a
work more vulnerable to fair use copying, while Free Republic suggests that web
availability makes a work less subject to fair copying, because other websites may
simply link to the plaintiff’s site.  The recent decision in Ticketmaster v.
Tickets.Com69 supports the Free Republic contention, since the Ticketmaster court
held it was not copyright infringement to “deep link” to another’s website in order
to pinpoint a document without paging through all the prior screens.  As a result,
future Free Republics may link directly to the article whose reportorial bias they
seek to expose through readership commentary.  As we will see in the next section,
the Southern District of New York has echoed Free Republic’s analyses of the
nature of transformative use and of market harm on the Internet.
66. Id. at 1463.
67. Id. at 1470.
68. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
69. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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III.  PRIVATE COPYING VIA COMMERCIAL INTERNET SERVICES70
Two recent decisions, UMG Recordings v. MP3.com,71 and A&M Records v.
Napster,72 address the liability of online commercial services that promote or
facilitate the “private” copying of sound recordings.  The results so far suggest the
ill-advisedness of Internet business plans that omit to compensate or secure
permission from authors, performing artists and other copyright owners for the
online delivery of their music.  In both cases, it is important to distinguish between
the technology of online music delivery in general, and the activities of these
defendant businesses in particular.
In the litigation against MP3.com, copyright owners targeted “My.MP3.com,” a
service that offers its subscribers a virtual library of music that the subscriber
uploads from the subscriber’s computer.  From the subscriber’s perspective, it is
like having a celestial jukebox of her own recordings (or of recordings she has
borrowed and uploaded) to which she can listen, through audio streaming, any time
and any place from which she has an Internet connection.  In fact, My.MP3.com
does not maintain separate music files for each subscriber, but instead keeps an
overall database of 80,000 recordings that it has ripped.  Moreover, the subscriber
does not in fact upload the music to My.MP3.com, but uploads the information
from the CD concerning the number of tracks the CD contains, and the length of
each track.73  This information supplies a “fingerprint” identifying the subscriber’s
CD; My.MP3.com then cross-references the fingerprint information from the
subscriber to the fingerprint information in its database, to identify the subscriber’s
holdings.  With respect to the audio streaming, My.MP3.com has acquired
performance licenses from the copyright owners of the musical compositions
contained in the sound recordings; however, the producers of the sound recordings
have not granted My.MP3.com performance licenses.  Moreover, My.MP3.com did
not obtain licenses from copyright owners of the musical compositions or of the
sound recordings to reproduce the works into the database.
In theory, the My.MP3.com system is premised on its subscribers’ legitimate
acquisition of physical copies of the sound recordings.  In fact, My.MP3.com will
also store in the subscriber’s “library” (or, more accurately, put on the subscriber’s
list of works that may be communicated from the My.MP3.com database) copies of
70. I am most grateful to Professor Jessica Litman for explaining the technology and discussing
the legal issues with me.  Errors that persist are mine, and I do not claim that Professor Litman would
agree with my analysis.
71. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  See also MPL
Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com, No. 00 Civ. 1979 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 17, 2000) (suit by music
publishers alleging violation of reproduction and distribution rights).  The parties subsequently settled,
see, National Music Publishers’ Association Press Release, Oct. 20, 2000, Music Publishers and
MP3.com Reach Landmark Agreement, at http://www.nmpa.org/pr/mp3agree.html  (last visited Mar. 17,
2001).
72. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001).
73. My.MP3.com also offers a service with cooperating record stores: when the subscriber
purchases the CD, the store transmits CD-identifying information to My.MP3.com, so that the customer
may access the song via the Internet, without having to “upload” it from her computer.
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entire CDs that the subscriber has downloaded from sites carrying ripped copies of
CDs, because the My.MP3.com database cannot tell the difference between
fingerprint information uploaded from a physical CD, and fingerprint information
uploaded from a ripped copy of the CD.  By the same token, however,
My.MP3.com will not enter into the subscriber’s “library” copies of individual
ripped songs, as single songs do not communicate the necessary fingerprint
information.  Thus, although the My.MP3.com enterprise may encounter some
“leakage” by cross-referencing from unlawfully acquired copies of CDs, it appears
that most of the subscribers’ “uploads” derive from legitimate sources.
By contrast, Napster deals in individual song files.  The provenance of these is
likely to be more suspect than the My.MP3.com CDs, but Napster from the outset
took no precautions whatsoever concerning the origin of the copies of the works
that its subscribers may acquire and further communicate.  Napster crosslinks MP3
files on its subscribers’ hard drives: it distributes a software package that includes a
searchable directory function, a chat function, a real time file transfer protocol
function, and a player function that enables subscribers to listen in real time to
music stored on other subscribers’ hard drives (as well as to acquire a copy for their
hard drives).  A Napster subscriber lists on the directory the files he is willing to
“share” with other subscribers (the listing specifies not only the composer, title and
artist, but also the audio quality level of the recording, and the speed of the
subscriber’s modem connection).  The directory does not distinguish between
purchased MP3 files (for example, those downloaded from a site such as
eMusic.com), or MP3 files that the subscriber has created by ripping the contents of
the subscriber’s own CDs, and files acquired by downloading songs ripped from
CDs from other sources.  Subscribers use the searchable directory to find other
subscribers currently online who have listed recorded selections the requesting
subscriber seeks; the requesting subscriber clicks on the desired directory entries to
acquire copies of the songs.  This transaction proceeds directly between the
subscribers.  Napster enables the transactors to “meet,” but does not itself conclude
the transaction.  Despite characterizations of Napster as a music file “swapping”
service,74 the subscriber from whom the requester has obtained a copy does not in
fact give up her copy; files are not “traded,” they are copied.  Thus, any copy
residing on a Napster subscriber’s hard drive has the capacity to turn into as many
additional copies as there are Napster subscribers.
Because the My.MP3.com and Napster services facilitate the making of
“private” copies, the lawsuits posed the questions  whether either service is directly
or contributorily liable for copyright infringement, or if the services’ or the
subscribers’ conduct is excused by either the §1008 bar on copyright infringement
74. See, e.g., Dick Kelsey, RIAA Submits Revised Napster Injunction, NEWSBYTES, at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/162058.html (Feb.  15, 2001) (describing Napster as a “file
swapping service”); Brad King, Napster Faces Shutdown, WIRED, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41752,00.html (Feb. 12, 2001) (describing Napster as a
“file trading application”); Napster’s Day in Court, Threat of Damages Could Cripple Service, CNET, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-201-4774158-0.html (Feb. 12, 2001) (describing Napster as “The
popular music file-swapping service”).
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actions “based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of a [digital audio
recording] device for making digital musical recordings,” or by the fair use
doctrine, or, in the case of Napster, by § 512 of the Online Service Provider
Liability Limitation Act.
A.  MY.MP3.COM
MP3.com’s creation of a database of 80,000 ripped recordings furnished the
basis of its direct liability for copyright infringement. Section 1008 does not shelter
My.MP3.com’s ripping of CDs, because My.MP3.com is not a “consumer.”75  But,
perhaps if My.MP3.com’s customers could themselves lawfully send their CDs to
My.MP3.com, then My.MP3.com’s copying might be excused as the functional
equivalent of each user creating a separate library of files. On the other hand, even
if a consumer might enjoy a “place shifting” privilege to copy her CDs to post on
her own website (whose access she restricted to herself),76 it does not necessarily
follow that the privilege shields a third party who goes into the business of creating
the personalized digital library and supplying access to it.  For example, courts
have stated that educational institutions and professors may enjoy a fair use
privilege to photocopy from protected works for purposes of teaching, but they
have nonetheless held that it is not fair use for an off-campus, for profit, photocopy
shop to prepare course packs at the professors’ behest, without the copyright
owner’s authorization.77  Because My.MP3.com carries advertising, and may begin
charging subscription fees, it is clearly a commercial intermediary.78
In its decision awarding summary judgment to the record producers, the
Southern District of New York proved quite inhospitable to MP3.com Inc.’s
contention that creating a database of ripped CDs to enable subscribers to access
their collections was a “transformative ‘space shift’”: “this is simply another way
of saying that the unauthorized copies are being transmitted in another medium –
an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of transformation.”79
With respect to the market harm fair use factor, the MP3.com court, like the
Free Republic court, emphasized that “a further market that directly derives from
reproduction of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works”80 remains within the copyright
owner’s control.  Indeed, where Free Republic underlined defendants’ incursion on
75. Moreover, a general-purpose computer is not a “digital audio recording device,” and the hard
drive is not a “digital audio recording medium” under § 1008.  See discussion infra regarding Napster’s
§ 1008 defense.
76. Cf. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing “space
shifting” privilege to transfer music on the consumer’s hard drive to a portable digital video player; the
court did not inquire into the provenance of the music on the hard drive). See discussion infra.
77. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996);
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  I thank Prof. Jessica
Litman for this observation.
78. My.MP3.com’s “Terms and Conditions” do not preclude this possibility.  My.MP3.com Terms
and Conditions at http://www.mp3.com/my/terms/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
79. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
80. Id. at 352.
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new markets that the copyright owner was already exploiting, MP3.com stressed
plaintiff’s right to control:
even if the copyright holder had not yet entered the new market in issue, for a
copyright holder’s ‘exclusive’ rights, derived from the Constitution and the Copyright
Act, include the right, within broad limits, to curb development of such a derivative
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the
copyright owner finds acceptable.81
MP3.com might have hit upon the clever business idea of enhancing consumer
convenience, but that did not mean the enhancement should be free of copyright
owner charges or control.
Copyright, however, is not designed to afford consumer protection or convenience,
but, rather, to protect the copyright holders’ property interests....Stripped to its
essence, defendant’s “consumer protection” argument amounts to nothing more than a
bald claim that defendant should be able to misappropriate plaintiffs’ property simply
because there is a consumer demand for it.82
The MP3.com decision is consistent with the Second Circuit’s 1998 ruling in
Infinity Broadcasting v. Kirkwood,83 in which the court rejected a fair use defense
to the retransmission of radio broadcasts over phone lines.  That case involved non
transformative audience shifting, because defendant made plaintiff’s broadcasts
available, without alteration, to distant listeners.  The Infinity court ruled that the
copyright entitled its holder to control who could access its transmissions;
defendant’s activities disrupted that control and enabled defendant to replace
plaintiff in distant markets.  MP3.com, like Free Republic, is a further rejection of
what one might call “redistributive” fair use, an aspiring doctrine that would excuse
the broad unpaid distribution of works on the dual grounds that copyright must not
rein in the progress of new technologies of communication, and that the public is
enriched by greater exposure to works that it enjoys.84  Rather, according to these
courts, when technology opens up new markets and wider audiences it is not fair
use to bring the work to more people by means of unlicensed copying or
unauthorized public performance.
But, one may object, the My.MP3.com service did not purport to bring the
recorded music to more people, only (in theory) to those people who had already
purchased the CDs.  Nonetheless, in order to make the work available to the same
audience in different places, My.MP3.com was not in fact streaming its
subscribers’ own copies, it created a massive database; this substantial and
systematic copying condemned its activities.  Copying in order to create a single
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
84. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas: Will Copyright Survive the Napster
Bomb? Nope, But Creativity Will, WIRED, at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/download.html
(Oct.  2000)(celebrating the end of copyright and the arrival of “dot.communism”). See also, Eben
Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant, Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY (August
1999), at http://old.law.columbia.edu/publications/anarchism.html.
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library corresponding to its subscribers’ combined collections may have made
sense from a business point of view, as a single library avoids duplication across
collections, and thus saves space on the server.  The consolidated library may also
have facilitated faster delivery to subscribers than would searching individual
files.85  But creating a faster, cheaper operation by means of copying does not enjoy
a strong claim to fair use, particularly when the more streamlined operation gives it
an advantage over competitors who lose time and incur transactions costs by
seeking copyright licenses.86
Because My.MP3.com was making its library available to any member of the
public who subscribed to the service, it was also publicly performing the musical
compositions and sound recordings.  With respect to public performance, MP3.com
Inc. had acquired performance licenses from the copyright owners of the musical
compositions contained in the sound recordings.  Thus, My.MP3.com’s audio
streaming of the musical compositions to subscribers from “their” digital libraries
would come under the ASCAP and BMI licenses.  The performing rights societies
do not, however, license the reproduction of the musical compositions into the
My.MP3.com database.  The music publishers control reproduction rights in the
musical compositions; they did not license My.MP3.com, and, indeed, they were
plaintiffs in one of the copyright infringement suits against My.MP3.com.87  (The
record producers licensed neither reproduction nor performance rights in the sound
recordings.)
As to the claim the music publishers ultimately settled, one might inquire, for
the sake of the analysis, whether statutory provisions authorizing the creation of
ephemeral recordings incidental to licensed public performances of the musical
compositions would have legitimated the creation of the database.  But the terms of
§112(a) do not fit My.MP3.com’s activities.  The exemption permits the making of
“no more than one copy or phonorecord of a particular transmission program
embodying the performance....”88  This exception was primarily designed to permit
radio and television stations to prerecord their broadcast programming.  In the case
of My.MP3.com, there is no “transmission program.”  There is a general database
of recordings, but My.MP3.com engages in no “programming”; the customer
constitutes “her library” and selects the CDs she wants to hear.  The further
conditions on the ephemeral recordings exemption are similarly ill-adapted to
My.MP3.com.  The phonorecord is to be “used solely for the transmitting
organization’s own transmissions within its local service area,” and the
85. Or than running programs to cross-reference and purge duplicates from online delivery
services that store and stream back subscribers’ own collections, but that, unlike My.MP3.com, do not
themselves copy to create a database.  See, e.g., services cited infra n. 95.
86. See Michigan Document, supra note 77 (off-campus copy shop that saves itself the time and
effort of obtaining copyright permissions competes unfairly with copy shops that do seek permission).
87. MPL Communications, Inc. v. MP3.com, No. 00 Civ. 1979 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 17, 2000).
The parties subsequently settled, see, National Music Publishers’ Association Press Release, Oct. 20,
2000, Music Publishers and MP3.com Reach Landmark Agreement, at http://www.nmpa.org/pr
/mp3agree.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
88. 17 U.S.C. §112(a)(1).
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phonorecord is to be “destroyed within six months from the date the transmission
program was first transmitted to the public.”89  But an Internet service like
MP3.com has no “local service area”; a customer can access “her” library from
anywhere in the world from which she has Internet access.  Moreover, even if the
My.MP3.com database qualified as a “transmission program,” My.MP3.com did
not propose to delete it within six months.
With respect to the public performance by transmission of the sound recordings,
the record producers did not pursue a performance right claim.  Nonetheless, for
completeness of analysis, I note that no ephemeral recordings exemption applies to
excuse the reproductions of the sound recordings in the My.MP3.com database
unless the performances of the sound recordings are lawful.  Because My.MP3.com
offers an audio on demand service, it does not qualify for a compulsory sound
recordings performance rights license under §114(d)(2).90  In the absence of a
negotiated license, therefore, My.MP3.com would be violating the digital
performance right in the sound recordings, unless a fair use defense prevails.
My.MP3.com may not bootstrap its performance of the sound recordings to its
licensed performance of the musical compositions; the performance right in the
song is distinct from the performance right in the sound recording.  When no
compulsory license applies, each right must be licensed.91
MP3.com subsequently settled with four of the five record labels.  The case
proceeded to an assessment of statutory damages with respect to Universal, the
remaining defendant.  Characterizing the infringement as “willful” under § 504 of
the Copyright Act, the District Court set the damages at $25,000 per CD, but
declined to rule on how many of the 80,000 copied CDs’ copyrights were owned by
89. Id. §112(a)(1)(B)(C).  The statute also requires that “no further copies or phonorecords are
reproduced from” the phonorecord of the transmission program.  Id. §112(a)(1)(A).  But in audio
streaming the songs to its customers, My.MP3.com is making RAM copies.
90. Under §114(d)(2), subscription digital audio transmission services and “eligible
nonsubscription transmissions” (e.g. non-interactive webcasts that conform to the “sound recording
performance complement” and other statutory limitations) may obtain statutory licenses of the digital
performance right in sound recordings.  Transmissions that are “part of an interactive service” are
explicitly excluded from the scope of the compulsory license; negotiated licenses must be obtained.  An
“interactive service” is defined at §114(j)(7).  The §112(e) statutory license to make an ephemeral
phonorecord recording is dependent on the availability of a statutory license to perform the sound
recording by means of a digital transmission.
91. See 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(3)(C) (to perform recorded music publicly by means of interactive
digital transmission, the interactive service must acquire not only a performance license in the sound
recordings, but also in the musical compositions).
There is a further question whether My.MP3.com, by streaming the recorded performances of the
musical compositions is also reproducing and distributing copies of these works to the subscriber.
My.MP3.com’s streaming is not intended to permit retention of copies, but production and distribution
of RAM copies is nonetheless occurring.  It is not clear whether those copies would be actionable if the
rest of the transaction is lawful.  § 115(d) excludes from the definition of “digital phonorecord delivery”
“a real-time, non-interactive subscription transmission of a sound recording where no reproduction of
the sound recording embodied therein is made from the inception of the transmission through to its
receipt by the transmission recipient in order to make the sound recording audible.”  A service like
MyMP3.com would be disqualified because the service, albeit “real-time” is interactive.  In addition, in
the course of the delivery, RAM and cache copies are being made.
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Universal.92  MP3.com had contested Universal’s ownership, claiming that
Universal had improperly registered the sound recordings as works made for hire.
Resolution of that contentious issue93 was avoided when Universal ultimately
settled with MP3.com.
MP3.com, it should be stressed, did not involve “place shifting,” of the kind
apparently endorsed as a fair use in RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia,94 in which end
users themselves effected the copying from their computers onto the place-shifting
device, there the “Diamond Rio” portable MP3 player.  The MP3.com court
therefore did not need to confront the question whether end-user copying and
storage would have infringed.  By the same token, the court did not need to address
what one might call the “Rio in cyberspace”: the question did not arise whether an
Internet service that offered individual-access celestial storage lockers for end-users
to stock themselves would be an infringer.95  A service that neither initiates the
copying, nor makes the uploaded files available to anyone other than the
subscriber, could nonetheless at least in theory be liable as a primary infringer on
the bases that the file the subscriber sent to the server results in a copy made by the
service, and/or that sending the file back to the subscriber when she wishes to
access it from afar effects a “distribution” of a copy.96  Nonetheless, the level of
service-initiated activity posited here is far less than in MP3.com, and more closely
resembles that involved in the Rio case.  The storage box service’s acts may be
sufficiently attenuated and auxiliary to those of the user that any liability on the
part of the service for infringing the reproduction right should depend on whether
the end user is an infringer.97  This is, essentially, a contributory infringement
analysis: the service is facilitating end-user conduct, but if that conduct is not
infringing, then neither is the service’s contribution to it.  If “place-shifting,” as
narrowly circumscribed here is fair use, then celestial storage locker services
should escape liability for infringing the reproduction right.98  We will return to the
92. See UMG Recordings Inc v. MP3.com, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
2000).  See also 109 F. Supp. 2d 223 (declining to calculate damages on a “per song” rather than “per
CD” basis).
93. In late 1999 § 101 was amended to include “sound recordings” on the list of commissioned
works capable of being deemed works for hire.  On Oct. 27, 2000, President Clinton signed legislation
repealing the amendment. Congress specified that its repeal did not in any way determine whether a
sound recording might nonetheless be deemed a work made for hire.  See Pub. L. No. 106-379, H.R.
5107, 61 P.T.C.J. 4-5 (Nov. 3, 2000).
94. Supra, note 76.
95. See, e.g., www.myplay.com; www.streamload.com; www.freedrive.com; www.idrive.com.
96. See, e.g., Playboy Ents. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993), Playboy Ents. v.
Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Marobie-Fla. v. NAFED, 983 F.Supp. 1167 (N.D.
Ill. 1997).
97. By contrast, if the service consolidates its subscribers’ uploads and eliminates duplicates, so
that it is streaming one file to all the subscribers who uploaded it, the service would probably require
licenses for the public performance of the musical compositions and for the interactive performance of
the sound recordings.  In this case, the service’s act resembles that of a traditional broadcaster: it is
irrelevant to the public performance right in the musical composition that radio listeners may already
own copies of the recorded musical composition and therefore could listen to their copies at home or on
portable players.
98. Note, however, that the argument presumes a legitimate source of the uploaded copy (or at
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place-shifting argument in the context of the discussion of the Napster controversy.
B.  NAPSTER
In contrast to MP3.com, there is no basis for a primary infringement claim
against Napster. Napster does not store files on its servers.99  Nor does Napster
itself effect the distribution of copies from one subscriber’s hard drive to another
Rather, the claim against Napster raises Napster’s derivative liability for the
primary infringements of its users.  One basis of liability is contributory
infringement: Is Napster inciting its subscribers to make unlawful copies of musical
compositions and of sound recordings, or at least knowingly facilitating that
copying?100. Another basis is vicarious liability: Does Napster have the right to
supervise and control its subscribers’ activities, and does it derive a direct financial
benefit from those activities?101  Because Napster’s liability would stem from
primary infringements committed by its subscribers, it is necessary to determine
whether the fair use doctrine would excuse end-users’ prima facie infringing acts of
copying and making works available from their hard disks.  A related issue is
whether §1008 of the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act applies to  bar an action for
facilitating the making of private copies from other subscribers’ collections.
Beginning with prima facie infringement, it is clear that Napster subscribers are
making copies; this engages the reproduction right.  Napster subscribers are also
making copies available to others for further copying; this effects a digital
distribution of copies.  To understand why that is the case, imagine the following
scenario: Napster subscriber Jack Ripper has copied onto his hard drive “Greed is
Awesome,” the latest hit song from the immensely popular group 3 Dead Rats.  3
Dead Rats, and its label, Death Jam Records,102 have not authorized the distribution
of the group’s recordings through MP3 sites.  Jack Ripper now makes his copy
available to other Napster subscribers by listing it on the Napster directory; one
hundred thousand subscribers who are online at the same time as Jack consult the
directory and click on Jack’s entry in order to copy “Greed is Awesome” from
Jack’s hard drive onto theirs.  Ignoring for the moment the question of whether
least reasonable ignorance on the part of service as to the source of the copy).  A service that, like
My.MP3.com, stores full albums, rather than individual songs, is more likely to store copies made from
a lawfully acquired original, because individual songs make up most unauthorized MP3 files.  By
contrast, a service that welcomes individual MP3 files, might be vulnerable to a charge of willful
blindness as to those copies’ source.  But see, RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th
Cir. 1999) , supra note 76, in which the Court did not inquire into the source of the copies “place-
shifted” onto Rio players.
99. See Jennifer Sullivan, RIAA Suing Upstart, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,32559,00.html (Nov. 15, 1999); Napster Copyright Policy,
at http://www.napster.com/terms(last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
100. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971).
101. See, e.g. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); Shapiro
Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (setting forth standard for vicarious
liability).
102. To my knowledge, the song, the group, and its record label are completely fictitious.
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Jack’s initial copying (whatever its source) is infringing, is Jack Ripper a primary
infringer if he simply opens his hard drive for others to copy?  Were Jack Ripper
making the music available over a website, he would most likely be held to be
“distributing” copies.103  Making the files available to users of a program that
delves into the disseminator’s hard drive does not seem analytically different: in
both cases, users end up with copies, as intended by the person who made the work
available.  Had Napster facilitated true “trading,” in which the “sharing” subscriber
deleted her copy after one subscriber made a copy, then this activity might have
been analogized to first sale doctrine-protected lending, in which a singe hard copy
changes hands. The “first sale” limitation on the distribution right,104however, does
not entitle the lawful possessor of a hard copy to duplicate it.  The limitation
therefore does not apply to either distribution via a website or distribution via
Napster, because the website operator or the subscriber from whom the copy
originates is not giving up her copy to another user; she is keeping her copy, while
making it possible for all other websurfers or Napster subscribers currently on line
to make copies as well.
The District Court found that Napster subscribers’ prima facie activities were
not excused by the fair use doctrine, and that Napster knowingly facilitated those
acts.  The court also rejected Napster’s assertion that under the Supreme Court’s
Sony decision105 Napster allowed sufficient non infringing uses that any infringing
applications could be disregarded.  The Court showed equal inhospitableness to
Napster’s invocation of § 1008 of the Audio Home Recording Act, and to the “safe
harbor” provisions of the Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Act.106  On
July 26, 2000, the court entered an order, stayed two days later by the Ninth
Circuit, preliminarily enjoining Napster from facilitating end-user copyright
infringement through use of the file transfer proprietary software and directory.107
The Ninth Circuit heard argument on October 2, 2000.  On February 12, 2001 it
announced a decision upholding in almost all respects the district court’s doctrinal
analysis, but remanding to modify the scope of the injunction.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision may be most notable for the apparent banality of its
fair use discussion.  At first blush, the court simply applied a very straightforward
fair use analysis, leaving little quarter for doctrinal innovation.  In fact, by
declining to embrace a variety of new approaches to digital “private” copying, the
court announced a clarion reaffirmation of the application of traditional copyright
103. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Playboy
Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (making available on a website
for others to download constitutes distribution of copies).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).  Note, however, that commercial rental or lending of phonorecords is
prohibited under § 109(b).
105. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 512.  The District Court opinion is reported at 114 F.Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
107. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No.  C 99-5183-MHP (N.D. Cal.  July, 2000)
(transcript from hearing granting preliminary injunction, July 26, 2000), available at
http://www.riaa.com/PDF/NapsterPatel.pdf; prelim.  inj. stayed by No. 00-16401, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18688 (9th Cir.  July 28, 2000).
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precepts to the Internet.  This does not mean that the court was insensitive to the
claims of new technology.  On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit departed from the
District Court’s reasoning regarding the scope of the burden the entrepreneur of a
new copyright-exploitative technology should bear to avoid infringement.  The
Ninth Circuit also took pains to distinguish file sharing technology in general from
Napster in particular.  Only the latter, the court stressed, was under scrutiny and
subject to sanction.
It is worth examining the court’s opinion in some detail, in order to highlight its
implications for digital distribution of copyrighted works.  On fair use, the court
focused on the first and fourth factors: nature and purpose of the use, and impact of
the use upon the potential market for the work.108  Like the Second Circuit in
Infinity Broadcasting,109 and the Southern District of New York in MP3.com, the
court found nothing “transformative” in simply retransmitting the work in a
different medium.  More importantly, the Ninth Circuit also upheld the
characterization of the end-user activities as “commercial.”  The District court had
found the activities commercial because: “Napster users get for free something they
would ordinarily have to buy.”110  This remark recalls the Supreme Court’s
reminder that “The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole
motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”111
But, one might object, getting the copyrighted work for nothing is not the same
as exploiting the work; “exploiting” implies commercialization, or at least further
distribution, and the fair use inquiry into the “commercial” character of the use
properly should address only whether the use is exploitative.  Nonetheless, if
“exploitation” suggests further distribution, then that characterization is amply
satisfied, as Napster users do not merely download for themselves, they lavishly
“share” with others. The Ninth Circuit, in any event, did not limit its concept of
“commercial” to uses involving further dissemination; the court’s references to the
“repeated and exploitative” character of Napster copying indicate that systematic
avoidance of purchasing copies is also “commercial.”112  On the other hand, the
court’s conjunction of “repeated and exploitative” suggests that sporadic copying
for personal enjoyment might yet be considered “non commercial.”  Echoes of the
distinction between permissible sporadic and impermissible “repeated and
exploitative” copying may be found elsewhere in the copyright law.  For example,
the provision on reproductions by libraries entitles libraries to make “isolated and
unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single copy or phonorecord of the same
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)(4).
109. Supra, note 83.
110. 114 F.Supp.2d at 912.  Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 496
(1984) (Blackmun, J.,  dissenting) (copying for personal enjoyment is no more non commercial than is
shoplifting).
111. Harper & Row Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
112. See 239 F. 3d at 1015, citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F.Supp. 679. 687 (N.D.Cal.
1994) (use is commercial when users download video games “to avoid having to buy video game
cartridges”).
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material on separate occasions,” but excludes “systematic reproduction or
distribution.”113  The scale and intensity of Napster copying falls so much on the
side of “systematic reproduction [and] distribution,” that to call it “non
commercial” would drain the label of meaningful content.  In any event, even were
one to consider, as the Ninth Circuit did not, that personal enjoyment copying can
never be exploitative or “commercial,” it certainly can compete with the copyright
owner’s market for the work.
With respect to that factor, the Ninth Circuit, like the District Court, focused on
two markets, the traditional market for sale of hardcopy CDs, and the evolving
market for online music distribution.  The appellate court declined to disturb the
District Court’s evidentiary findings that Napster use had a deleterious impact on
sales of CDs, notably around college campuses where Napster use is particularly
intensive. More importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit recognized the
independence and the significance of the new form of exploitation.  Essentially, it
is irrelevant that Napster may not harm traditional modes of exploitation: “lack of
harm to an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to
develop alternative markets for the works.”114
The Ninth Circuit’s attention to the impact of Napster on emerging technologies
of distribution of works of authorship aligns that court with others, notably
MP3.com and Free Republic, who have understood that new markets matter,
especially in digital media.  Some might find the appellate court too deferential to
copyright owner determinations of how best to exploit those markets.  The court’s
discussion of Napster’s invocation of sampling as an exculpating non infringing use
illustrates this deference.
Napster had asserted that subscribers used the service to listen to a song as a first
step toward deciding to buy the CD.  This “sampling,” claimed Napster, enhanced
CD sales.  The District Court disagreed that “sampling” in fact promoted purchases
of CDs. More importantly, that court found that Napster’s uncontrolled free
“samples” were “commercial” and competed with plaintiffs’ own exploitation of a
market for sampling, as well as undermined the digital download market.115  The
Ninth Circuit upheld these determinations.  At first blush, the analysis of the market
for sampling might appear vulnerable to charges of circular reasoning: any market
the copyright owner could conceivably be exploiting is one that others may not
enter without permission or payment.116  In fact, Napster’s “sampling” implicates
two new markets, both of which the plaintiffs had entered or were endeavoring to
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(g).
114. 239 F.3d at 1017, citing L.A.. Times v. Free Republic, supra note 65 and UMG Recordings
v. MP3.com, supra note 71.  Cf. WTO Dispute Resolution Panel Decision, WT/DS160/R, ¶¶ 6.172-173
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234da.doc (June 15, 2000)  (analyzing second step of
TRIPs article 13 “three-step test”: lack of harm to one mode of exploitation of a work irrelevant to
question whether exception under scrutiny “conflicts with [another] normal exploitation of the work.”).
115. 114 F.Supp.2d at 913-15.
116. See, e.g., the dissent of Judge Jacobs to the Second Circuit’s decision in American
Geophysical, supra note 59, 60 F.3d at 932, charging majority with circular reasoning for finding that
markets that copyright owners now may effectively license are no longer as subject to the fair use
defense as they may have been when copyright enforcement would have been too burdensome.
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exploit: one for partial and temporary downloads (“samples,” properly understood),
the other for digital delivery of permanent copies of the entire song.  As to the first
new market, copyright owners had already entered that market, licensing
promotional downloads for which Internet retailers pay royalties, although end
users generally do not.
More significantly, “sampling,” as practiced by the copyright owners, is
designed to be just that, a taste of the music, not a fully digested four-course repast.
Hence the practice of licensing “thirty-to-sixty second samples or...full songs
programmed to ‘time out,’ that is, exist only for a short time on the downloader’s
computer.”117  Napster “samples,” however, are “full, free and permanent”118
copies.  Because Napster “samples” are “full, free and permanent,” they also
compete with the copyright owner’s digital download market.  Thus, it is irrelevant
that the “samples” may not harm, and might even have a positive impact on, the
hardcopy CD market; the copyright owner enjoys “the right to develop identified
alternative markets, here the digital download market.”119  The court’s qualification
of the phrase “alternative markets” with the description “identified” may be
intended to limit the scope of the inquiry into the impact of defendant’s use upon
prospective new markets to those that copyright owners have in fact taken some
steps to exploit.120  Where there are identified new markets, any “favor” the
infringer may have done the copyright owner by increasing sales in one market
cannot offset the usurpation of the new market.121
The Ninth Circuit disposed rapidly of Napster’s two other alleged substantial
non infringing uses.  Napster had relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s Diamond
Multimedia122 decision concerning portable MP3 players, urging that the ruling be
understood to bless any kind of personal time- or space-shifting.  The appellate
court branded its prior decision “inapposite,” stressing the difference between
space-shifting material so that “only...the original user” was “exposed” to its new
location, and listing a work on the Napster system so that it becomes “available to
millions of other individuals.”123  Unlike My.MP3.com, or celestial storage locker
services, Napster is not helping its subscriber access “her” collection, and only
“her” collection, from places other than the one in which her CDs are physically
located.  Napster is helping the subscriber make songs on her CD available so that
millions of other people can access those songs (as well as so that she can access
millions of other people’s song collections).  A Napster subscriber need not
designate all the songs on her hard drive for “sharing,” but she cannot “space shift”
a song –  in other words, access the song from another computer – without listing
117. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018, quoting 114 F.Supp.2d at 913-14.
118. Id.
119. Id., citing L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1469-71.
120. Cf. NBA v. Motorola , 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (misappropriation claim: inquiry into
unfair competition limited to potential markets that plaintiff has taken “demonstrable steps” to exploit).
121. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018 (example of film that incorporates and publicizes a previously
unknown song, “the boon to the song does not make the film’s simple copying fair”).
122. Supra, note 76.
123. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
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the work on the Napster directory, whence it becomes available to all Napster
subscribers.  The court correctly recognized that the Napster system obliterates any
distinction between (personal) “space shifting” and (public) “distribution of
copies.”  Moreover, other, less cumbersome,124 technologies are lawfully available
to assist the user who wishes to enjoy digital music files without having physically
to take them with her.
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the other
alleged non infringing uses, such as chat rooms and the New Artist program, on the
ground that plaintiffs had not sought to enjoin these uses, and that the uses could be
separated from Napster’s primary infringement-facilitating activities.125
Turning to secondary liability, the Ninth Circuit departed somewhat from the
District Court’s decision.  The appellate court’s opinion tacitly acknowledges the
concern expressed in many amicus briefs that copyright not stifle the advance of
technology.  While not all these briefs asserted the lawfulness of Napster’s
particular operation of peer-to-peer file sharing technology, all concurred that
“P2P”offers a valuable means of communication whose dissemination should not
be jeopardized by copyright enforcement.126  Thus, the Ninth Circuit cautioned,
“We are compelled to make a clear distinction between the architecture of the
Napster  system and Napster’s conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the
system.”127
The difference in the courts’ approach centered on interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,128 the
“Betamax” case.  The Supreme Court had declined to hold Sony contributorily
liable for customers’ use of the video tape recorder (VTR) to violate the
reproduction right.  The Supreme Court had found the VTR “capable of substantial
non infringing use”  because customers employed the VTR for the fair use of
124. See services cited, supra, note 95.  The “space shifting” contention lacked credibility as a
practical matter as well: a Napster user who wished to access her home files from work, for example,
would be obliged to leave her home computer on and connected to the Internet throughout the workday.
This scenario presumes, among other things, that the subscriber’s Internet access service would not
disconnect the home access in the event of prolonged inactivity (for example during the user’s
commuting time from home to work).  The Napster subscriber might engage in a more attenuated form
of “space shifting” if, instead of attempting remote access to the files on her hard drive, she accessed
songs already lawfully in her collection that she can find on other Napster users’ hard drives (and
refrained from accessing songs not already in her collection).  This, in effect, would make Napster a
highly distributed variant of My.MP3.com.  The absence of a centralized database of songs copied by
Napster, however, would not exculpate this variant, because each participant would still be making
his/her collection available to the public.  Moreover, a ruling that this My.MP3.com-esque use of
Napster constituted a “significant non infringing use” sufficient to exculpate all of Napster would
require turning a blind eye to the acts of those who use Napster not merely to access their own
collections remotely, but to augment their collections.
125. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019, citing 114 F.Supp.2d at 917.  The District Court had also rejected
the New Artist Program as pretextual, as defendants did not initiate the program till after suit was filed.
114 F.Supp.2d at 904.
126. See six amicus briefs posted to Napster website, at http://www.Napster.com/pressroom/
legal.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
127. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
128. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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“time-shifting” “free broadcast” television programs (the court excluded cable and
pay television, as well as retention copies from its analysis).129  The District Court,
having found that Napster’s alleged non infringing uses were either infringing or
trivial (or pretextual), and having found that Napster knew that its users were
copying and distributing music files without authorization, held that Napster had
failed to demonstrate that it was capable of commercially significant non infringing
uses.130  To the Ninth Circuit, the District Court had “improperly confined its
analysis [of non infringing uses] to current uses, ignoring the system’s
capabilities....Consequently, the district court placed undue weight on the
proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future
noninfringing use.”131  The Ninth Circuit similarly warned that it would “not
impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file
sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights.”132
These statements may comfort those concerned about conflicts between
copyright and new technology, to the extent that the court has clarified that
deployment of a technology that the exploiter knows can be used to infringe does
not of itself satisfy the knowledge element for liability for contributory
infringement.  The court appears even more technology-tolerant in asserting that a
proper “Betamax” analysis must take account of non infringing uses to which the
technology can in the future be put.  That could even suggest that Napster in its
current incarnation might escape liability so long as it is susceptible of future non
infringing applications.  Suppose, for example, that I devise and distribute a
program I call “Prankster.”  It works like Napster, but unlike Napster, it permits
“sharing” not only of MP3 files, but of any kind of file, including text and images.
While many MP3 files may well be suspect, as most music and sound recording
copyright owners have not yet authorized distribution of their works in unprotected
MP3 format, many text and image files are created to circulate freely.  Although
my program currently appeals most to music “sharers” (this would be especially
true following issuance of an injunction against Napster),  I anticipate an increased
volume of text and image-sharing as well.  As to these files, we are positing that
Prankster facilitates non infringing use.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, my
knowledge that Prankster proves popular among music sharers is not enough to
engage my contributory liability.  The prospect of contributory infringement is
further reduced by Prankster’s capacity for substantial authorized “sharing” of text
and image files.  Thus, It is unlikely that a court will order me to shut down the
Prankster service.
But, these are the prospects only in the abstract.  Contributory liability will not
lie “merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of
copyrighted material.”133  “Structure,” however, is one thing; specific use of the
129. Id. at 442-43.
130. 914 F.Supp.2d at 916-18.
131. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
132. Id. at 1020 – 21.
133. Id. at 1021.
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structure is another.  Having disagreed with the district court’s structural analysis,
the Ninth Circuit nonetheless upheld its determination that contributory liability
existed, because “Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material is
available using its system….”134  The Ninth Circuit endorsed the analysis in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,135 in
which the Northern District of California held that an online service provider’s
contributory liability depended on demonstration that the service had actual
knowledge of specific infringing acts.  Netcom further stated that if, once notified
of the alleged infringements, the service failed to purge the infringing material from
the system, the service could be held contributorily liable.
The Ninth Circuit’s contributory infringement analysis, then, points toward
further generalization of the “notice and take down” approach implicit in Netcom,
and implemented by Congress with respect to service provider liability in the
DMCA.136  Returning to “Prankster,” this means that I will not be liable for merely
creating and disseminating the system, despite its music-”sharing” proclivities, but
if a music or sound recording copyright owner identifies unauthorized files, I must
disable them, or face contributory liability should the end-use prove infringing.
This puts the burden on the copyright owner to police and notify, and on me to
respond.  The more notices I receive, the more vulnerable my system becomes,
unless I can devise a means to sequester the legitimate uses from the infringing
ones (or I take a license for the latter, should a license be offered).  This may mean,
as a practical matter with respect to online digital media, that the Sony doctrine will
not be available to bootstrap infringing uses to non infringing ones.  For the Ninth
Circuit, substantial non infringing uses, including future ones, save the exploiter of
the technology only in the absence of knowledge of specific infringements.  Once
that knowledge is conveyed, the burden is on the technology-provider to exclude
the specific infringement.  The more specific infringements are notified, and
especially if they are notified in large volume on a continuous basis,137 the more the
obligation to exclude begins to look like a de facto duty to redesign the system to
forestall those infringements in the first place.138
134. Id. at 1022 (emphasis in original).
135. 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
136. See 17 U.S.C.  § 512.
137. See e.g., John Borland, Napster’s Zero Hour Approaching on Filters, NET NEWS.COM, at
http://www.news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-5081628.html (March 9, 2001).
138. Thus, at bottom, the difference between the Ninth Circuit and the District Court may be more
in attitude than in impact.  The District Court expressed some annoyance at Napster’s proclaimed
inability to redesign its system to exclude infringements.  In its oral order awarding the preliminary
injunction, the court chided:
though it may be technologically difficult, when you create a program that had the very purpose
that defendant is capable of exercising supervisory powers over its service. And I have to add
here that Napster espouses that it had, and then you – you know it’s sort of like, you know,
becoming an orphan because – by your own hand and then throwing yourself on the mercy of the
court because you’re an orphan. It’s rather hard to hear that sound of throwing themselves on the
mercy of the court because this technology just isn’t going to allow them to do or control the
infringement.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No.  C 99-5183-MHP (N.D. Cal.  July, 2000) (transcript from
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There is an important difference between the Napster technology and the Sony
videotape recorder.  Videotape recorders are a free-standing technology; as the
District Court in Napster recognized, once a machine was sold, its producer could
no longer follow up how consumers employed it.139  As a result, the determination
of contributory infringement entailed an all-or-nothing outcome: if the
manufacturers were held liable, then no machine could be distributed, despite its
capacity for non infringing uses; if no liability, then the machine can be distributed,
despite its capacity for infringing uses.  Splitting the difference by limiting
distribution of the machine to a class of non infringers was not a possibility.
Whether as a matter of judicial political instinct, or of technology policy
considerations, when the choice is all or nothing, those who end up with nothing
are not likely to be the producers and consumers of a vastly popular new device
that is susceptible of legitimate applications.  With Napster, by contrast, the
difference could be split; the online technology makes possible the confinement of
the service to a class of non infringers.140  The user class will be restricted to non-
infringers because, with the implementation of notice and take down, only
authorized files will remain available for “sharing.”  Once “all or nothing” is no
longer the only response the technology allows, the legal rule should show similar
flexibility.
That leaves open the question what the analysis should be if a system’s
“architecture” did not permit separation of infringing and non-infringing uses or
users.  According to the Ninth Circuit, that could mean that there is no contributory
infringement.  But it seems troublesome to rule that one who deliberately builds an
online system in a way that confounds the distinction should escape liability.  The
copyright owner may have the burden of discovering and notifying about
infringement, but is the potential contributory infringer entitled to make that burden
insuperable?141  This concern may, however, prove unfounded, at least if some
software developers and entrepreneurs continue to prove as resourceful in finding
infringements as others are in facilitating or concealing them.142
The District Court had also held Napster vicariously liable for end-user
infringement, finding that Napster derived a direct financial benefit from its ever-
hearing granting preliminary injunction, July 26, 2000) at *81, available at
http://www.riaa.com/PDF/NapsterPatel.pdf.The court’s sardonic comparison of Napster to the self-made
orphan underscores the court’s view that a defendant who exploits the Internet’s capacity to promote
indiscriminate “sharing,” should not be heard to object, when ordered to limit the promiscuousness of
those exchanges, that the technology it unleashed does not permit a more modest form of interchange.
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis eschews parenticide, but still requires Napster to devise a means to control
the infringement.
139. 114 F.Supp.2d at 916-917.
140. I thank Prof. Maureen O’Rourke for these observations.
141. For example, the developers of Freenet claim that infringements will be untraceable. See e.g.,
Ian Clarke, My views on Censorship and Copyright, at http://www.freenet.sourceforge.net/ index.php?
page=philosophy (last visited Mar.21, 2001).
142. See.e.g., Michael Learmouth, The Oline Enforcer, THE STANDARD (Feb.16,2001) at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,22315,00.html.mail
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increasing user base, and that it had the power to supervise and control end-user
activity.143  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court’s assessment of the first
element, but departed slightly from the second.  Napster’s service policy reserves
the right to terminate subscribers for copyright violations.  The Ninth Circuit stated
that the District Court had overestimated Napster’s ability to determine whether
end users were infringing: “Napster’s reserved ‘right and ability’ to police is
cabined by the system’s current architecture . . [which] does not “read” the content
of indexed files…”144 This might suggest that if the technology provider builds the
system so as to ensure that its ability to identify infringing material, and therefore
to police it, is highly limited, it will not be vicariously liable.  As a practical matter,
however, for the system to work, the user must be able to identify the material; if
the user can identify it, then so can the system-deviser.  To avoid vicarious liability,
then, the technology-provider who reserves the right to police must in fact do so.
This might counsel non-reservation of the right, but there are other reasons, within
and without copyright, to  reserve and to exercise the right to exclude subscribers
who violate the law.  Within copyright, for example, disclaiming a right to control
might subject the provider to liability for contributory infringement by virtue of
“willful blindness.”  Without copyright, for example, disclaiming a right to control
might subject the provider to claims of breach of the service contract if the provider
responded to an infringement notice by taking down the subscriber’s posting.
If, in light of the contributory infringement discussion, it appeared that copyright
owners incurred the burden of identifying and notifying of  infringements, it now
appears that some of that burden bounces back, when the defendant also faces
vicarious liability.  This may mean that non commercial sites, for example, those
organized by teenagers who lack the for-profit aspirations of many “dot-coms,”
might not assume a burden to police, because the “direct financial benefit” standard
would not be met.  If, however, running the system allows its participants,
including those who run the system, to engage in massive free copying, a court
might find a financial benefit, just as the Ninth Circuit found “repeated and
exploitative” personal use copying to be “commercial” under the fair use factors.
Napster asserted further defenses to secondary liability, that the 1992 Audio
Home Recording Act barred an infringement action, and that the Online Service
Provider Liability Limitation Act provisions of the DMCA extended a “safe
harbor” to Napster’s activities.  With respect to the first defense, the Ninth Circuit
relied on its earlier interpretation of § 1008 of the AHRA in Diamond Multimedia
that computers are too multi-purpose to qualify as “digital audio recording
devices.”  Moreover, the court held, songs fixed on computer hard drives cannot
qualify as “digital music recordings.”  With respect to the online service provider
defense, the court left open the question whether § 512 shields secondary
infringers.  Rather, it stated that a full trial was needed to resolve issues including
whether Napster was an “information location tool” service provider under §
512(d); whether Napster would not be deemed “aware” of infringing activity absent
143. 114 F.Supp.2d at 920-22.
144. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
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“official” notice, as prescribed in § 512; and whether Napster had timely
established a compliance policy under § 512(i).  Because plaintiffs had “raise[d]
serious questions regarding Napster’s ability to obtain shelter under § 512,” and the
balance of hardships favored plaintiffs, injunctive relief was appropriate.145
Finally, in specifying the scope of an injunction that it characterized as “not only
warranted but required,”146 the Ninth Circuit reiterated that plaintiffs incurred the
burden of notifying Napster of infringements, before Napster has a duty to disable
access, but that Napster also has a “burden of policing the system within the limits
of the system.”147  In the preliminary injunction issued March 5, the district court
required the plaintiffs to notify Napster of specific infringing files, but also,
consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the burden of purging
infringements is “shared between the parties,’ imposed two proactive obligations
on Napster.  First, the court observed that “given the transitory nature of
[Napster’s] operation,” Napster could more easily search its files than could
plaintiffs; the court therefore ordered Napster “to search the files available on its
system at any particular time against lists of copyrighted recordings provided by
145. Id. at 1025.  The Northern District of California had ruled that Napster could not qualify for
the § 512(a) access provider exemption because of the key role of the Internet in subscriber transactions.
A “service provider” is largely exempted from liability for providing “transitory digital network
communications” “by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for,
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider...” if the
service provider did not initiate the transmission, if it routed or provided the connections automatically,
and if it did not select the recipients of the material.  While Napster does not interfere in its subscribers’
choices, and thus may seem sufficiently removed from their interchanges, Napster did not correspond to
the factual predicate for the exemption: even if Napster might be a “service provider,” it does not
“control” or “operate” a “system or network.”  Napster works by having its subscribers control or
operate the file exchange program that Napster distributes; the inter-subscriber connections occur over
the Internet, not “through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”  17
U.S.C.  § 512(a).
 The District Court also held that Napster failed to meet the statutory requirement that it adopt and
“reasonably implement” a copyright compliance policy under § 512(i).  Napster did not post any such
policy until after the record producers initiated suit.  Nor, the court held, did it reasonably implement a
policy for terminating repeat infringers. 114 F. Supp.2d at 918
The District court did not address Napster’s claim that it is a provider of  “information location tools”
shielded from damages liability under §512(d). This provision addresses “infringement of copyright by
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or
infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory...” 17 U.S.C.  § 512(d).
Napster supplies a directory that enables online users to link to one another; each online location (user
hard drive) may contain infringing material (unauthorized copies and phonorecords of recorded music).
But the liability limitation applies only if the location tool service provider does not know that the
“online location” contains infringing material, or is not “aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent,” and if it, upon notification, disables access to the material.  Even if
infringement were not “apparent” from the directory listings, once Napster receives notice from the
copyright owners, it faces full liability if, upon proper notification, it does not respond” expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to” the hard drives containing unauthorized copies.  Id.  Appropriate response
to  “takedown” notices may well lead to the same result as that imposed by an injunction in this case.
One significant difference between liability for contributory infringement and compliance with § 512, is
that the latter precludes an award of damages, while the remedial scheme for the former includes both
injunctive relief and damages.
146. Napster 239 F.3d at 1027.
147. Id.
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plaintiffs.”148  Second, the court permitted plaintiffs to submit to Napster in
advance of the recordings’ release the artist name, recording title and release date
of sound recordings that were likely to be infringed on the Napster system.  The
court ordered Napster to block access to those recordings “beginning with the first
infringing file … As Napster presently has the capability … to store information
about and subsequently screen for a particular recording, the burden is far less and
the equities are more fair to require Napster to block the transmission of these
works in advance of their release.  To order otherwise would allow Napster users a
free ride for the length of time it would take plaintiffs to identify a specific
infringing file and Napster to screen the work.” 149
Although it obtained a modification in the scope of the injunction, Napster had
endeavored to escape injunctive relief altogether, in favor of a compulsory royalty,
on the ground that “great public injury would be worked by an injunction.”
This contention seems to have tried the Ninth Circuit’s patience to excess; it
rejoined:
We are at a total loss to find any ‘special circumstances’ simply because this case
requires us to apply well-established doctrines of copyright law to a new technology.
Neither do we agree with Napster that an injunction would cause ‘great public
injury.’…. Imposing a compulsory royalty schedule… [would force plaintiffs] to do
business with a company that profits from the wrongful use of intellectual properties.
Plaintiffs would lose the power to control their intellectual property: they could not
make a business decision not to license their property to Napster, and, in the event
they planned to do business with Napster, compulsory royalties would take away the
copyright holders’ ability to negotiate the terms of any contractual agreement.150
Did the Ninth Circuit show excessive deference to plaintiffs’ potential business
plans?  Napster supporters might contend that it was plaintiffs’ inability or
unwillingness to espouse a business plan for Internet music delivery that fostered
services like Napster in the first place.151  Even assuming that some copyright
owners have, to put it gently, lacked alacrity in developing digital delivery
offerings, the “use it or lose it” premise that underlies this critique is fundamentally
pernicious.  Copyright confers “exclusive rights” over the acts of reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, public performance and public display.152  These rights are
“subject to” the fair use doctrine and other statutory exceptions.153  But the rights
148    A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No.99-05183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, *6 (N.D.
Cal. March 5, 2001) (order granting preliminary injuction).
149      Id. at *8
150. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1028.
151. See, e.g., Eben Moglen et. al., Victory or Defeat? Did The Record Industry’s Court Triumph
Insure a Future Full of Profits – Or Seal Its Doom?,” SALON, ¶¶ 2-5 at
 http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/02/12/napster_reactions/index.html (Feb. 12, 2001); Hill Takes
Notice of Napster Legal Fray, WASHINGTON POST ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2001)at
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A125211-2001Feb15.html(last visited Feb. 19,
2001)(citing Senator Hatch ‘s caution that Congress may choose to impose a compulsory license if
record companies do not soon authorize online music delivery).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
153. Id.
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under copyright would no longer be “exclusive” were the exceptions to evolve into
a doctrine that any publicly desirable means of reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, public performance or public display that the copyright owner has
neglected or declined to carry out herself (directly or through licensing), then
becomes “fair” game for others to exploit.  Similarly, a system in which
compulsory royalties supplant injunctive relief is no longer a regime of  “exclusive
rights.”  As the Ninth Circuit understood, copyright vests authors not merely with
an entitlement to payment for copying and other exploitations; it grants them
control over whether and how the work shall be exploited.154  Both economic and
moral concerns underlie this control.  The exercise of control entails the ability to
set one’s own price.  Equally significantly, it empowers authors and copyright
owners to select their licensees; licensees who must vie for the grant are likely not
only to bid up the price, but also to offer assurances of quality maintenance.
Finally, it enables authors to determine what kinds of exploitations fit their vision
for the work.  A work whose copyright has not expired is not a public resource
freely available to the best exploiter or to anyone else who desires a copy.
Assertions that copyright should yield when the author is reticent, or when a third
party has done the author a “favor” by increasing the popularity of  the work,
misconceive the purpose of copyright, which is not merely to promote
dissemination, but to achieve that goal “by securing for limited Times to
Authors…the exclusive Right to their…Writings….”155  The Constitution has
provided for a system in which authors’ determination how to exploit their works
promotes the “Progress of Science.”156
That said, the political pressure of 50 million Napster users now clamoring for
free music is likely to have legislative consequences unless sound recordings
copyright owners hasten the availability, at high convenience and low cost, of
digitally distributed music.157 For many observers, and perhaps some lawmakers as
well, new technology cases urge adoption of a special rule: “If everybody’s doing
it, it must be fair use.”158  In the case of Napster, the argument would echo the old
advertisement: “50 million users can’t be wrong.”  As a matter of traditional
copyright doctrine, fair use does not compel, and should not counsel, socializing
the fruits of new modes of copyright exploitation.  For the moment, the courts have
held with tradition; it remains to see whether they continue to be the arena for
resolving copyright and new technology disputes.  Some might relish the
developing irony: copyright owners leery of the ability of the 1976 Act to address
154. See, e.g., Harper & Row Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (control over distribution
right entitles author to determine whether, how, and by whom work will be published); Castle Rock Ent.
v. Carol Pubs., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (copyright entitles author to determine whether or not to
authorize the creation of certain kinds of derivative works).
155. U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8.
156. Id.
157. See Hill Takes Notice of Napster Legal Fray, WASHINGTON POST ONLINE (Feb. 16, 2001), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A125211-2001Feb15.html.
158. See Jane Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 18
(1997).
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problems of digital distribution, pushed Congress to create technology-targeting
amendments in the DMCA.  Since that legislation’s passage, however, most of the
digital copyright cases have called for application of pre-DMCA copyright
provisions.  These, at least so far, have proven sufficiently robust in their
application to new problems of technology and copyright that right holders might
well resist further legislative action.
IV.  INTERNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW
The Internet harbors many choice of law issues.  Because content on an
unrestricted-access website hosted by a server located in one country can be
retrieved by users located in any country with Internet access, questions arise as to
the law(s) applicable to any infringements that may result from the hosting or
communication of the content.159  The recent controversy provoked by the
Canadian website iCraveTV160 illustrates the problem.  ICraveTV converted into
streaming video format the broadcast signals from Canadian programs, and from
U.S. television programming received across the border, and made the
programming available via its website.  ICraveTV claimed that its capture,
conversion, and redistribution of the U.S. programming was lawful under Canadian
law concerning secondary transmissions of broadcast performances.161  In theory,
iCraveTV restricted access to its website to Canadian users; accordingly, asserted
iCraveTV, only Canadian law should apply to the controversy.  In fact, the
screening method employed was easily circumvented: iCraveTV requested proof of
the websurfer’s residence by requesting the surfer’s telephone area code; only
respondents giving Canadian area codes would be granted access to the site.  It was
not difficult to identify and supply a Canadian area code, particularly when
iCraveTV’s own Toronto area code was posted on the site.  Moreover, once a surfer
had gained initial access to the site, iCraveTV did not require entry of a Canadian
area code for subsequent access.  As a result, iCraveTV’s transmissions were
accessible throughout the U.S.
The producers brought suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, where
iCraveTV’s President and its International Sales Manager resided.  With respect to
the Canadian business entities, the court found general personal jurisdiction over
the non-resident defendants on the basis of their continuous and systematic contacts
with Pennsylvania.162  Among the contacts the court identified were: sales of
159. For further discussion of this issue in general, see, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, The Cyberian
Captivity of Copyright: Authors, Users and Copyright on the Internet, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH.  L.J. 347 (1999).
160. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q2d 1831 (W.D. Pa 2000)
(preliminary injunction granted February 8, 2000).
161. See Complaint at ¶ 48, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No 00-121 (W.D.
Pa. filed Jan. 20, 2000), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/iCrave_complaint.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2001).
162. The court applied Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e), and the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§5322(b) (Purdons 1981), which permits Pennsylvania courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over out
of state defendants to the full extent permitted by the Constitutional due process clause. Pennzoil Prods.
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advertising out of a Pittsburgh office, employment of an agent in Pittsburgh to
work in that office, and domain name registration for iCraveTV.com in the U.S.,
with technical and billing contacts listed in Pennsylvania.  The court further found
that defendants’ activities in Pennsylvania were “integrally a part of the activities
giving rise to the cause of action asserted.”163  Finally, the court noted that
defendants had streamed plaintiffs’ programming to U.S. citizens throughout the
U.S. overall, and had attempted to sell advertising throughout the U.S. through
agents in New York and Pennsylvania.
On choice of law, the court found sufficient points of attachment with the U.S.
to apply the U.S. Copyright Act to defendants’ activities. The court found that the
alleged infringement occurred in the United States when U.S. citizens “received
and viewed defendants’ streaming of the copyrighted materials,”164 without
plaintiffs’ authorization, even though the streaming began in Canada.  The receipt
of the transmissions in the U.S. constituted public performances under U.S.
copyright law.  Moreover, the transmissions to the U.S. accounted for a substantial
portion of iCraveTV’s total business.  For example, on January 17, 2000, an
iCraveTV employee reported that log books monitoring traffic showed that
approximately 45% of iCraveTV’s traffic was from U.S.-based users; a January 25,
2000 report from a “private ad serving system” counted 1.6 million impressions
from U.S. visitors (second only to Canadian visitors); “Real Video” logs of Internet
addresses showed “substantial numbers of persons in the U.S. received the
streaming of programming.”165  The court ordered iCraveTV to cease
retransmitting U.S. television programming.  Following initiation of a suit in
Canada alleging that iCraveTV’s retransmissions were not permitted under
Canadian law either, iCraveTV and the producers settled, and iCraveTV has ceased
retransmitting U.S. television programming.166
The choice of law approach followed by the U.S. court, and urged by the
producers, privileged territorial contacts with the U.S.: U.S. law applied to
transmissions received on U.S. territory, regardless of their legitimacy in the
country of origin of the transmission.  On the facts of the case, the territorial
connection was far from slight or fortuitous: U.S. viewers made up close to half of
iCraveTV’s audience, and the large number of U.S. viewers attracted advertisers.
And much of the programming retransmitted by iCraveTV originated in the U.S.  A
harder case might have been presented had the U.S. nexus been weaker.
Arguably, a territorialist approach disfavors, or at least encumbers, Internet
Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998).
163. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q2d 1831 (W.D. Pa 2000)
(adopting Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with Respect to Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction at ¶ 13, available at http://www.mpaa.org/ Press/iCrave_findings.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2001).
164. Id. at ¶ 8.
165. Id. at ¶ 21.  ICraveTV used a “RealVideo” server to stream the programming.
166. See http://www.iCraveTV.com– clicking on “Watch TV” now reads “Yes, the rumours are
true. Our television rebroadcasting service is offline.”  See also John Borland, iCraveTV.com exec
discusses his start-up’s short life, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-
200-1560999.html (Feb. 29, 2000).
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commerce.  Where the territory whose law is applied, however, has so many
contacts with the defendant’s enterprise as to appear the true target of the off-shore
defendant’s acts (as plaintiffs argued was the case with iCraveTV), the call for
seamless Internet commerce through application solely of the law of the point of
departure loses some appeal.  In the absence of targeting, a choice of law approach
that looks only to the law of the country of origin of the communication does have
the considerable merit of simplifying Internet transactions.  Nonetheless, it poses
some problems.  First, if the country of origin is a “copyright haven,” i.e. a country
with substandard copyright laws, then one may fear that the point of origin
approach will spark a “race to the bottom” for Internet entrepreneurs.  Second,
when there are significant substantive variations between different countries’
copyright laws (even among members of the Berne Union), the point of origin
approach has the effect of extruding the country of origin’s copyright policy
choices, to the detriment of copyright policies in the other countries of receipt.
Suppose, for example, that Canada has enacted a very liberal cable and satellite
retransmission policy, because it wishes to stimulate investment in bringing
television programming to remote areas in the far North.167  Canadians and other
copyright owners who exploit the Canadian market may in effect be subsidizing
access to programming in Nunavut.  That is a political and social policy choice
open to Canadians.  It does not follow that entrepreneurs may or should set up shop
in Canada, claim the benefit of the Nunavut retransmission rates, and then
disseminate the programming not only to Nunavut but also, and especially, to the
U.S. – in competition with U.S. licensees of the programming who are paying full
price (or at least a higher statutory retransmission rate) for their licenses.168
Ideally, a choice of law rule that designated the law of a single country to govern
the ensemble of Internet copyright transactions would considerably simplify the
legal landscape, and thus promote Internet commerce.  In the realm of negotiated
licensing, this result may be achieved by contractual choice of law.169  In the
context of infringement claims, however, so long as significant substantive
differences persist in national copyright laws, a choice of law rule that designates a
single applicable law risks vesting legislative competence in laws that are either
relatively underprotective or, for that matter, relatively overprotective (depending
on the choice of forum and its choice of law rules) compared with the laws of other
affected countries.
167. Barbara L. Waite, Communications and Copyright in Canada and the U.S.: A Survey of
Current Law and Proposals for Change, 1 TRANSNAT’L LAW 121, 155 (1988).
168. For a fuller discussion of the domestic policy implications of choice of law rules favoring the
law of a single country over the laws of the countries of receipt, see Graeme Austin, Domestic Law and
Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.
L. & THE ARTS 1(1999).
169. At least where the author can grant worldwide rights, and the grantee is not bound by
agreements with analogous entities (such as performance rights societies) in other countries to limit
licensing to its local territory, leaving the other territories to its co-contractants.
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CONCLUSION
The Internet copyright cases examined here call not only for interpretation of the
provisions of the recent Digital Millennium Copyright Act, but also for application
of principles developed in pre-DMCA cases involving digital media and digital
networks.  What may make the current controversies different is the intensity of
their impact on end-users.  While the defendants in the current cases are generally,
albeit not exclusively, commercial intermediaries, many of the practices here at
issue pose the prospect of mass uncompensated copying by the public.  Hence the
feeling of desperation and even moral outrage that one senses pervades many of the
copyright owners’ actions.170  From the user perspective, digital media offer
unparalleled opportunities to access and enjoy copyrighted works; copyright
owners’ endeavors to staunch the free (as in unpaid) flow of works are misguided
attempts to stop the inexorable forward march of technology for the sake of
preserving mastodonic business models of distribution.171  Certainly the Internet
will compel adoption of new business models, and the sooner copyright owners
adapt, the better.  The tools the DMCA and copyright caselaw give copyright
owners to confront copyright use on the Internet should be employed to promote
broad distribution of works of authorship at reasonable, and variable, prices. If
copyright owners instead wield these tools to enhance control without facilitating
dissemination, we can expect to see courts expand the zones of excused uses,
whether or not the excuses are doctrinally persuasive.172  Copyright owners cannot,
and should not, control every Internet use, but neither should every use prompt an
excuse, lest we undermine the ability of copyright owners, and especially of
individual creators, to make a living from their creativity.q
170. See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, Artists to Napster: Drop Dead!SALON (Mar. 24, 2000), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2000/03/24/napster_artists/index.html
171. See Chris Oakes, Pundits ask who owns Music?,  WIRED NEWS (Feb. 26, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,34605-2,00.html Scott Rosenberg, The Napster Files,
SALON (Feb. 4, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/col/rose/2000/02/04/napster_swap
172. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
